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Reconstructing Local Government
Daniel Farbman*
After the Civil War, the South faced a problem that was almost
entirely new in the United States: a racially diverse and geographically
integrated citizenry. In one fell swoop with emancipation, millions of former
slaves were now citizens. The old system of plantation localism, built largely
on the feudal control of the black population by wealthy white planters, was
no longer viable. The urgent question facing both those who sought to reform
and those who sought to preserve the "Old South" was: What should local
government look like after emancipation? This Article tells the story of the
struggle over the answer to that question. At the center of that struggle is an
untold legal history of local government reform during Reconstruction. In the
years immediately after the Civil War, idealistic Yankee reformers went south
with the explicit aim of remaking the "fabric of southern culture"by rebuilding
the South in the image of their northern homes. Specifically, in North
Carolina, Virginia, and South Carolina, these reformers rewrote state
constitutions to replace the plantation and county court with townships
modeled on the New England town. Southern conservatives resisted the new
townships, understanding them as foreign impositions targeted to destroy
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their old way of life. Within a decade they had dismantled the new townships
and built the foundations of a new Jim Crow local order rooted in the county
and approximatinga return to the plantation. By telling this new history, this
Article contributes to present scholarship in at least two ways. First, the story
highlights a binary struggle between "communitarian"localism embodied in
the civic participationof the New England town and '"oroprietary"localism
embodied in the private power of the plantation owner. This struggle was
framed with crystal clarity during Reconstruction, but it remains a powerful
analytic tool for understanding today's debates and struggles over local
government. Second and relatedly, this history reveals the extent to which
racial anxiety shaped and continues to shape local institutions. The
communitarian township experiment was fueled by a vision of racial
equality-and the white supremacist response to it was fueled by resentment
and resistance to that vision. When we think about localism and racial
inequality, we tend to think about the responses to school desegregation in the
mid-twentieth century when racial resentment and fear during the "Second
Reconstruction" drove white flight and contributed to resegregation through
suburbanization. This Article shows that we may be looking at the wrong
Reconstruction. In fact, the pathologies of local government, racial
segregation, democracy, and protection of property were framed after the Civil
War, in the crucible of a direct conflict between utopian racial egalitarianism
and white supremacy.
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INTRODUCTION

The township system is an [e]ducator [i]n Self-Government, and has been commended,
at all times, by political thinkers, who have at heart the good of the people. It is one of
the grandest of political principles, leaving absolutely to neighborhoods the right to
govern themselves in local matters ... 1
Slavery is an indispensable police institution .... 2

In 1860, the population of Granville County, North Carolina,
was evenly split: half of the residents were free and half were slaves.3
1.
Address to the Voters of North Carolina, DAILY CONSTITUTION (Raleigh, N.C.), July 5,
1875, at 3.
2.

GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 98 (Richmond, A.

Morris 1857).
See Rosser Howard Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina:An Economic View, in 18
3.
THE JAMES SPRUNT HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS 64 (R. D. W. Connor et al. eds., 1926). While the

vast majority of the black population was enslaved, there were more than nine hundred free
blacks living in Granville County in 1860. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH
CAROLINA 17 (1943). Granville County, because of its even racial split and fortuitously thorough
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Local government for the free white citizens took the form of the old
county court system-appointed county justices of the peace (generally
drawn from the social and economic elite) ran the business of local
government. 4 Where slavery was strong (as it was in Granville
County), the counties were largely controlled by planter elites.5 In
every instance county governments were primarily dedicated to
protecting the property rights of residents. Counties provided courts
and minimal law enforcement, but few other services (schools, aid to
the poor, etc.).
One reason that the counties were weak was because another,
much stronger system of local government existed alongside and
within them. The slaves of Granville County were subject to the
despotic feudal control of slaveholders on their home plantations.6
With a few minor limitations, slaveholders had wide jurisdiction over
slaves' bodies and social lives.7 Although there were certainly
circumstances when slaves came into contact with the county court
system, 8 plantations were the primary unit of local government for the
vast majority of the black population.
recordkeeping, has been the focus of a number of studies of North Carolina in the nineteenth
century. Granville County was the main site of study for Laura Edwards's Gendered Strife and
Confusion: The PoliticalCulture of Reconstruction and Sharon Ann Holt's Making Freedom Pay:
North CarolinaFreedpeopleWorking for Themselves, 1865-1900.
4. Elites controlled local government as well. Except for sheriffs and county court
clerks, all county officials were appointed. Nominated by state legislators and
confirmed by the governor, the powerful justices of the peace held life tenures.
Virtually omnipotent in local affairs, they selected most other county officials, set tax
rates, determined road-building policies, established schools, and provided for aid to
the poor. In their judicial capacity they issued all writs necessary for legal activities.
Selected from the "best families" of each county and secure in the values of their
social class, the justices of the peace benefited their own kind in the conduct of local
affairs.
FRED ARTHUR BAILEY, WILLIAM EDWARD DODD: THE SOUTH'S YEOMAN SCHOLAR 4 (1997).

5.
Isabel Ferguson's description for Virginia applies well to eastern North Carolina: "The
county government, as adopted in Virginia, was a well established organization of great
influence when it was taken over by the planter to further his ends." Isabel Ferguson, County
Court in Virginia, 1700-1830, 8 N.C. HIST. REV. 14, 14 (1931).
6.

PHILIP D. CURTIN, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PLANTATION COMPLEX: ESSAYS IN

ATLANTIC HISTORY 12 (1998) ("[Tjhe owner not only controlled his work force during their
working hours, he also had, at least de facto, some form of legal jurisdiction. His agents acted
informally as policemen. They punished most minor criminals and settled most disputes without
reference to higher authority.").
7.
While there was law on the books that allowed a master to be prosecuted for killing one
of his own slaves, any violence short of killing was rendered explicitly permitted by Justice
Ruffin's famous ruling in State v. Mann that "the power of the master must be absolute, to
render the submission of the slave perfect." State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
8.
Ariela Gross has documented the important (if largely offstage) role that slaves played
in the daily business before the antebellum southern courts. See generally ARIELA J. GROSS,
DOUBLE CHARACTER:

SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM

(paperback ed. 2006). More recently, Laura Edwards added to this research documenting the
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In 1865 at the end of the Civil War, the once stable systems of
local government in Granville County (and across the South) were
broken. The feudal control of the planters on their plantations was
eradicated with emancipation. With the stroke of a pen at
Appomattox, the county's citizenry had doubled. More importantly,
that citizenry was, for the first time in American history, evenly split
between white and black voters. The weak county government that
had been run by the planters to protect their property was now tasked
with representing and governing a newly integrated population which
presented problems of local governance that had never been faced. All
of the thorny difficulties of Reconstruction were present: How should
freed slaves be integrated into the political community? How should
they live as neighbors with their former masters? How should
property, power, wealth, and influence be redistributed? How should
the South be modernized, reborn, protected? In the face of all this,
unable to return to the old system under slavery or chart a path
forward, local government floundered and failed. 9 What remained was
a question: What would local government look like in the post-bellum
South?
This Article tells the story of the struggle over the answer to
that question. At the center of that struggle is an untold legal history
of local government reform during Reconstruction. In the years
immediately after the Civil War, idealistic Yankee 0 reformers went
south to help renovate the conquered Confederate states. These men
and women were not shy about their desire to remake the South in the
image of their northern homes. Specifically, in North Carolina,
Virginia, and South Carolina, these reformers saw the need for
functional local government and embarked on a reform experiment
that sought to remake the very fabric of southern local government by
imposing the model of the New England town through the new state
constitutions.

ways in which slaves, as part of the antebellum southern local milieu, exerted influence on the
lived experience of local law. See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE:
LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH

(2009).
Laura Edwards describes "the inability of Granville County's conservative elites to
9.
control public space" in 1867 when, struggling to enforce the law and keep the peace, the white
elites of the county sought the aid of the hated Freedmen's Bureau. LAURA F. EDWARDS,
GENDERED STRIFE AND CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION 14 (1997).
10. Throughout this Article I will use the term "Yankee" not in the denigrating sense as
southerners at the time understood it, but rather to name a particular strain of self-identified
proud northerner. To be a Yankee was to believe that the North and northern politics and
culture were beacons of progress, prosperity, and republican virtue.
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Seeing Reconstruction through the history of what I will call
the "township experiment" changes the focus from state and national
institutions to the local, where the lived difficulties of the post-slavery,
post-war South were at play." The problem of local government in
Granville County was typical of the problem across the region.
Emancipation and integration were overlaid onto well-worn social,
political, and class structures, which combined to create a strong sense
of a southern "way of life" independent of government institutions.
Even where the township experiment was not proposed as a solution,
the struggle between radicals supporting Reconstruction and
conservatives pushing for southern Redemption was a local one. 12
Although the township experiment was only tried in three states, it
was less an outlier than a window into the complex local politics of
Reconstruction. The resistance to (and defense of) the townships
where they were imposed would have been much the same had it been
imposed elsewhere. All across the South, conservatives were
struggling to transition from plantation localism to what would
become Jim Crow localism. The otherwise subtle dynamics of this
transition are shown in stark relief by the fight over the townships.
Understanding Reconstruction as a local struggle-and struggle over
control and design of local government-traces new lessons out of
Reconstruction and into the present. Among the many that are latent
in the history, I present three that are essential to the argument of the
Article.
11. Mine is hardly the first legal history of Reconstruction to focus on local experience.
Laura Edwards's study of Granville County in Gendered Strife and Confusion and her more
recent Legal History of the Civil War and Reconstruction both observe the legal imprint of
Reconstruction on the daily, local lives of southerners. Still, the vast majority of legal history
focused on Reconstruction has understood Reconstruction in terms of federal law: the primary
contributions of Reconstruction to American law were the "second founding" embodied in the
Reconstruction Amendments. Originalists have delved into the history of the amendments to
justify Brown. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalismand the DesegregationDecisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). Historicists of other bents have been drawn like moths to a flame to the
tantalizing possibilities of the amendments, choked off by the courts. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The
Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010) ("Modern doctrine has not been faithful to
the text, history, and structure of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These
amendments were designed to give Congress broad powers to protect civil rights and civil
liberties; together they form Congress's Reconstruction Power."). A full catalogue of the articles
claiming new understandings of federal law drawn from historical accounts of federal
Reconstruction would take up far too much space, Suffice it to say that much less work has been
done on the way that the local legal changes during Reconstruction have shaped today's local
government law.
12. While Reconstruction needs no definition, Redemption may. I use Redemption here
consistently with the historical scholarship to refer to the movement of southern conservatives
and white supremacists to end Reconstruction and "redeem" the South by returning its
government to the hands of the white ruling class that had held power before the war. See
generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR (2007).
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First, close attention to the fight over the township experiment
reveals a fundamental disagreement between radicals and
conservatives over what local government was and should be. Radicals
were communitarian localists. 13 They believed that local government
was a vehicle of civic education, democratic engagement with one's
fellow citizens, and prosperity. Their view echoed John Adams's
definition of the pillars of the New England town as communal
gatherings and collective effort: town meetings, town militia, town
schools, and town church.1 4 Conservatives, by contrast, were
proprietary localists. Local government should not be a forum for
bringing people together, but rather a tool for protecting private
property. Their model was plantation localism, where the feudal
plantation was protected by the county court. Under plantation
localism, local government's role was not to build community, but to
protect the right to exclude others from one's property, family, or
society.
This struggle was not new. The history of American local
government law is, I propose, a history of the struggle between these
opposing views of what local government should be.15 Communitarian

13. I am using "localism" in a specific sense throughout the Article. In his famous two-part
description of "Our Localism," Richard Briffault defined localism as a position in a debate:
localists are "proponents of greater local power." See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part IThe Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). I am using it differently.
For me, localism refers to a theory of how local governance ought to work-what is local
government good for. It is possible, given this definition, to imagine a localism that believed that
local government was good for nothing and should be abolished. Importantly, localism is
different from local government in the same way that theory is always different from practice.
The structures of local government law are animated by localism, but not coextensive with it.
14. John Adams, Diary Entry (July 21, 1786), in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 400, 40001 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851).
15. Like any binary structure, communitarian localism versus proprietary localism erases
layers of nuance. On the one hand, one could easily subdivide each position into a number of
other more finely drawn descriptions. Jefferson, for instance, while a communitarian in the
southern context (see infra Part I), was far more interested than Adams in the individual civic
experience in a well-functioning local government. He emphasized that "by making every citizen
an acting member of the government. . . [the ward system] will attach him by his strongest
feelings to the independence of his country, and its republican constitution." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING
HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER
WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 9, 13 (Henry Augustine Washington ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott

& Co. 1871). On the other hand, as I will discuss further in Part III and in future work, the fact
that the two positions are largely rhetorical leaves open room for opportunistic shifting back and
forth. This is most likely when one can construct an argument that it is the true will of the
community that local government protect private property. Despite all this, I will persist in using
the binary because it reveals more than it obscures across the broad sweep of the story. The
fundamental differences between communitarian and proprietary localisms are greater than the
smaller internal differences within those camps, and while the rhetorical shiftiness undermines
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localism and proprietary localism clashed and mixed in the Early
Republic,
with northerners
generally embracing the more
communitarian model of town localism, while southerners embraced
the proprietary plantation ensconced within the county. These
competing conceptions of localism not only shaped the legal landscape
of the westward-expanding empire, they also fueled the sectional
conflict that would boil over in the Civil War.
Fast-forwarding past Reconstruction and Redemption, the
same tension between communitarian and proprietary localism still
structures the way we think about local government law. 16 Look at
nearly any contemporary local government problem and you will find
echoes of these two views of localism. Present-day communitarian
localists argue that authentically participatory local democracies can
govern well, instruct citizens in civic virtue, and heal racial, economic,
and class divisions within a community. Present-day proprietary
localists continue to respond that local control means the right to
exclude, the power to protect property (including from taxation), and
is a tool for protecting and rationalizing racial, economic, and class
segregation. The result is often a confusing mixture of the two with
the virtues of local democratic control being invoked to justify
proprietary ends.17 As I argue in Part III, the history of the township
experiment helps alleviate that confusion by showing that there can
be multiple rationales for local control. Sometimes advocates make
communitarian arguments to justify local control, and sometimes they
claims of intellectual purity, it also reinforces the fact that the two accounts of localism are,
indeed, distinct.
16. Indeed, versions of this binary are all too familiar in contemporary debates within the
local government law scholarship. In 1990 Richard Briffault drew a distinction between Gerald
Frug's "participatory" localism and Charles Tiebout's "economic" localism. Participatory localism
advanced the utopian hope that cities could be sites of participatory democracy and thus social
justice. By contrast, economic localism justified the city (but primarily the suburb) as the most
economically efficient way of organizing government. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 393-403 (1990). This split between
participation and efficiency maps onto a larger descriptive account which frames suburbs as
exclusionary, insular, and protective while cities are inclusive, immersive, and explosive. See
Richard Ford, Beyond Borders: A PartialResponse to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173,
1178-80 (1996). Participation and efficiency, like inclusion and exclusion, are binaries that map
onto the present state of local government. I propose that they are reflections of the
communitarian/proprietary binary that I am identifying and tracing here. As such, I am adding a
historical gloss to familiar terms of debate.
17. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974):
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over
the operation of the schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to
the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to the
quality of the educational process. . . . [L]ocal control over the educational process
affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking [and] permits the
structuring of school programs to fit local needs . . ..
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use the same core idea of what local government is for in order to
argue against local control when it serves proprietary ends. The
structures are more complex, but the essential debate is familiar
between the history and the present.
A second lesson emerges from the rhetoric of resentment that
Redeemers used to combat the township experiment and support their
arguments for a return to proprietary localism. Opponents of the
township appealed to resentment politics in two intertwined ways.
First, they painted the townships as oppressive outside impositions:
Yankeeizing.1 8 Second, they described the townships as vehicles of
"negro domination," allowing black voters to elect black local officials
and wrest control away from white southerners. Together outsider
resentment and racial resentment combined into a powerful
conservative resentment militating against progress, change, and
redistribution.
This cocktail of resentment politics is familiar from the
twentieth century civil rights story and from our own present moment
of racial tension. What the story of the township experiment
contributes is the extent to which this resentment is a product of local
disputes. Just as the racial resentment of a white southerner in 1870
was fueled by the prospect of being arrested by a black sheriff and
tried by a black magistrate, so too might we understand present
resentment politics as reflecting concrete local anxieties as much as, if
not more than, abstract national politics.
This leads to the third lesson. Southern conservatives
motivated by resentment during Reconstruction found themselves
with no government to turn to for retreat. The federal government was
more than a political opponent; it was perceived as a hostile
conquering power. State governments were dominated by the hated
Republican coalition of carpetbaggers, scalawags, and blacks. Now,
under the township experiment, local government was similarly alien.
In short, conservatives and white supremacists during Reconstruction
saw every layer of government as oppressive and illegitimate.
Oppressive because they were in the hands of their political
opponents; illegitimate because those hands were black. As a result,
conservative rhetoric opposing the townships went beyond resentment
of those in power and turned toward attacks on government itself-in
all its forms.

18. This term was used both by disparaging southerners and northern reformers. See
Charles D. Cashdollar, The PittsburghSoldiers'and Sailors' Convention, September 25-26, 1866,
48 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 331, 338 (1965) (quoting a general from New York, saying "there can be no
lasting peace until the South is chained down, revolutionized, Yankeeized").
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This turn away from government characterized Redemption
politics more broadly. When conservatives regained control over
government, they took out their hostility by crippling the power of
government at the state and local levels. State governments adopted
blanket policies of retrenchment, radically cutting back on
government spending and services, leaving behind only a shell of Jim
Crow regulations and protections for landowners. To protect against
too much local democracy, local governments were put under the
control of the state and served as bulwarks for white property owners
against integration, redistribution, and communitarian political
progress. Proprietary local government spent next to nothing on
services while it protected white elite power against the
promise/threat of communitarian political resistance.
The links between proprietary localism and anti-government
rhetoric during the 1870s point us toward similar connections today.
Although we tend to identify the Tea Party and other government
skeptics with opposition to the federal government, if we look from the
local level, it becomes clear that they do not have a great deal of trust
in local or state government either. The same local resentments are at
play, and, where they have control over all branches of government,
the same kind of minimal proprietary localism characterizes local
government. As I articulate in Part III, many of our present local
government structures, from suburbs to dissolving cities, can be
understood as proprietary localism fueled by intertwined racial and
outsider resentment.
A broader historiographical and methodological point frames
these three lessons. In the context of local government law
scholarship, this Article (and my work more broadly) offers a
heretofore unexplored historical perspective. The local history of
Reconstruction has not been told-but the same can be said of many
otherwise well-examined periods of American history. Although local
government law scholarship frequently considers history, we do not
have anything more than an episodic set of historical accounts of
localism as it was intertwined in national legal development. Related
to this, outside of cities (which have been well addressed) there has
been far too little work done on the formation of the non-city local
governments that blanket the country, determine its cartography, and
structure the lives of so many.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes local
government in the South before the Civil War. Construing enslaved
black residents as part of the political community, I describe
plantation slavery as a form of proprietary feudal local government.
This model did not go unchallenged, however. Jefferson and his
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political allies leveled a persistent (and persistently failing) challenge
to it on communitarian grounds. This Part demonstrates how
proprietary localism came to be bundled with the southern "way of
life." Part II is a history of the township experiment, focusing
primarily on North Carolina, with brief summaries of the experiments
in South Carolina and Virginia.1 9 Here, under the new stresses of
emancipation and Reconstruction, the battle lines between competing
visions of local government law were starkly drawn. To defeat the
township experiment, opponents proposed the most minimal form of
local government as the best hope of protecting the old proprietary
order. Part III offers present implications from this history by way of
three examples. Here I argue that the fundamental disagreement
between communitarian and proprietary localists manifests itself in
present-day local government disputes. Not only does the history give
us new tools to understand those disputes, but it suggests that what
has seemed like a battle over whether localism is a good thing might
actually be a battle over what version of localism we prefer. Finally, in
Part IV, I conclude with three provocations suggesting ways that the
history of the township experiment might change the way we think
about the role of local government and localism in the law more
broadly.
I. LOCALSM IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
We are pious toward our history in order to be cynical toward our government. We keep
summoning the founders to testify against what they founded. Our very liberty depends
so heavily on distrust of government that the government itself, we are constantly told,
20
was constructed to instill that distrust.

Anti-government voices in the present usually seek support
from history. Reference to the heroic founding moment is embedded in
the very name of the "Tea Party" movement. 2 1 The present-day
opponents of government suggest a return to a simpler time: a
"nineteenth-century Jeffersonian world of minimal government, low
taxes, absolute private property, individual rights, self-interested

19. I should note here, as I do in Part II, that a version of the township experiment was
also carried out in West Virginia in 1861 when the state split off from Virginia in order to stay in
the union. While that story shares much with the stories told in this paper, it is critically distinct
because without emancipation, conquest, and thus forced integration, the key ingredients of
advocacy and resistance were different.
20.

GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT

16 (1999).
21. For an exposition of the (mis)reading at the heart of this historical reference, see JILL
LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY'S REVOLUTION AND THE BATTLE OVER
AMERICAN HISTORY 1-19 (2010).
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entrepreneurship, and laissez-faire economics." 22 In this imagined
simpler time, self-governance was about individual freedom from
government oppression. Federal and state governments were weak
and local government was nonexistent. 23
One need hardly be a legal realist 2 4 to recognize that this
account of "limited" government could also be described as a set of
government priorities: to protect private property (including money),
to
protect
individual
rights,
to
encourage
self-interested
entrepreneurship, and to facilitate laissez-faire economics. Seen this
way, even the most romanticized version of antebellum "freedom" was
characterized by government-and most of it was local government. 25
In fact, what present day government skeptics seem to be describing is
an outline of proprietary localism. In reality, for much of the country,
this description did not fit the circumstances. Across most of the
North, strong norms of communitarian localism supported a widely
regulated and often prescriptive suite of local regulations. 26 In some
areas of the South, similar, if less formalized, webs of local regulation
and obligation dominated. 27 There was one particular instance,
however, where the romantic proprietary description fit the picture: in
states and counties where plantation slavery predominated. Here,

22.
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA ix (1996).

23. In the words of Citizens for Self-Governance, an organization founded by one of the
leaders of the Tea Party movement: "America was designed to be a self-governing society, where
decisions are made as close to home as possible." Who Decides?, CITIZENS FOR SELF-GOVERNANCE
(2016), https://selfgovern.com/who-decides/ [https://perma.cc/4H4X-YV2Y]. What does "close to
home" mean? Not quite state or local government, rather it means that "decisions are best made
by the individual, family, or community." Mission and Four Pillarsof Self-Governance, CITIZENS
FOR SELF-GOVERNANCE (2016), https://selfgovern.com/four-pillars-self-governance/

[https://perma

.cclV7B6-FYLK].
24. Although, I should admit here that I am on record as being a sympathizer. See Daniel
Farbman, The Scalpel and the Salve: Rekindling Romantic Realism, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 212
(2014).

25.
William Novak's The People's Welfare argues in the very first sentence that "[a]
distinctive and powerful governmental tradition devoted in theory and practice to the vision of a
well-regulated society dominated United States social and economic policymaking from 1787 to
1877." NOVAK, supra note 22, at 1. More recently, Laura Edwards built upon this foundation
showing the way that 'localized law"-grounded in governmental forms-structured life in the
antebellum South. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 8.

26.
Novak's study focuses primarily (though not entirely) on northern regulations, and
what he describes is a pervasive set of moral and economic interventions. See NOVAK, supra note
22, at 1 ("At the heart of the well-regulated society was a plethora of bylaws, ordinances,
statutes, and common law restrictions regulating nearly every aspect of early American economy
and society, from Sunday observance to the carting of offal.").
27.
See EDWARDS, supra note 8, at 3-16 (examining the Carolinas in explaining the South's
use of localized rather than state law to "keep the peace" by adjudicating criminal matters and
personal disputes).
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state and especially local governments were controlled by planter
elites who were eager protectors of their own autonomy on their
plantations. Here is where the logic of individual freedom (for slave
owners) and protection of property (land and slaves) was the highest
calling of government.
Understanding the plantation as the ideal of proprietary
localism is critical to understanding both the history of the township
experiment and the present implications of that history. On the
plantation, the owner's mastery over land and property was protected
by state and county to its maximum extent, 28 while the power of local
or state government to intervene was extremely circumscribed. As a
quasi-feudal system, a planter's home and lands were very much like
his "castle." In that sense, the plantation and the local governance
structure that supported it were a libertarian's dream. But, critically,
the plantation served other governance purposes as well. Planters
were entrusted with the power (essential to southern governments) of
policing and controlling much of the enslaved population in the
South. 29 In practice, then, plantations were local governments below
the county level where black residents were governed despotically.
Moreover, while the planters were rulers individually on their
plantations, they were also rulers collectively as a "regional ruling
class," controlling law and policy at the local and state level for much
of the Early Republic. 30 Thus, while planters themselves may have
been able to enjoy the benefits of proprietary local governments, those
subject to their direct control (slaves) or indirect control (poor whites)
were not.
This distributional dissonance highlights the extent to which
proprietary localism as practiced by southern planters was a means of
protecting the established racial and economic order. Although it was
successful, and plantation localism predominated across the South, it
was not unchallenged. A consistent, strong minority of southerners
sought to supplant the county and plantation with something more
Like all property rights, of course, the rights of planters on their plantation could only
28.
be protected by creating constraints on the rights of others. This meant that there was actually
fairly frequent litigation amongst slave owners to resolve disputes about the use and misuse of
their most valuable property-their slaves. See GROSS, supranote 8, at 23 ("Civil trials involving
slaves were the routine events bringing townsfolk and planters together to fight over their
human property. . . .").
29.

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,

THE DECLINING

SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE:

BLACKS AND

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 24-25 (3d ed. 2012) ("[A]1though the great majority of
slaveholders owned small farms where a few slaves labored beside their masters, most slaves
lived and worked on plantations where cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, or rice were cultivated on a
large, commercial scale.").
30. Id. at 25.
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communitarian. Beginning with Thomas Jefferson, these voices
argued that plantation localism upheld aristocracy and that it should
be replaced with a "ward system" modeled on the New England town.
Local government in the antebellum South was thus a subject
of dispute. In what follows, I outline the two competing models:
proprietary plantation localism and the communitarian ward system.
Understanding the terms of this dispute before the Civil War paints
the backdrop for the disputes that would emerge after emancipation
and during Reconstruction.
A. ProprietaryPlantationLocalism
We have tended to look at antebellum governance through the
eyes of white citizens. The debate between Jeffersonians and planters
was a debate over how free white landowners should organize local
government. The question of how black residents fit in has never been
raised. Most whites agreed that this was the easy question: black
residents of the South were governed by their masters (or, in the case
of free blacks, were increasingly pressured to either return to slavery
or move north). 31 Controversial or not, it was clear that plantations
were governed by planters. And seen through the eyes of the slave,
there can be no doubt that planters had the powers of government. I
propose that construing slaves as part of the population is a starting
point for understanding the outlines of local government in the
antebellum South. Proprietary localism depended upon excluding
black residents from the political community and creating an
alternative method of governance to control them. The paternalistic
control that planters exerted on their plantations bled over into the
county court system as well. The counties were protectionist, not
participatory. They maintained the status quo; they were not a forum
for changing it.
1. The Manorial Plantation
Defined by the rules of private property and outside the
jurisdiction of any town or city, on first blush the plantation might
seem to represent the ideal of retreat from government. This nostalgic
31.
In Virginia, as part of a campaign to eliminate free blacks from the state, "whites
encouraged free blacks to return to slavery," arguing that the "slaves' lot was superior to that of
freed people." WILLIAM A. LINK, ROOTS OF SECESSION: SLAVERY AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM
VIRGINIA 157 (2003). In Georgia, on the eve of the Civil War, the House of Representatives
passed a bill that would "allow free persons of color to go into voluntary slavery, or to compel
them to move from the state." CLARENCE L. MOHR, ON THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM: MASTERS
AND SLAVES IN CIVIL WAR GEORGIA 48 (2001).
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ideal continues to do cultural work, 32 but it does not describe the
actual operation of plantation localism in the antebellum South. Just
as the New England town structured the daily social and political lives
of residents, so too did the plantation structure the daily social and
political lives of both black and white southerners within its orbit. 33

Plantations were forms of despotic local government, and a
large number of southerners were under their jurisdiction. 34 Most
obviously, on plantations and smaller farms, enslaved people were
subject to the (almost) absolute authority of the slave owner. 35 More
broadly, plantation owners extended their governing influence over
poor whites in the immediate neighborhood either by hiring them to
work on the plantation as overseers or craftsmen, entering into
tenancy contracts with them, or exerting other forms of control over
their economic and social lives.36

The private and public lives of those who lived on and around
plantations were governed through formal or informal institutional

32. A version of this is evident in the famous collection of southern nostalgic manifestoes,
I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition. Donald Davidson meditated on what
he took to be the universal southern (male) desire to "retire to the farm and live like gentlemen."
Donald Davidson, A Mirror for Artists, in I'LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN
TRADITION 28, 54 (1977). Though pitched against urban industrialization, the agrarian romantic
view took the old plantation as a model of escape and remove. Where the West and the "state of
nature" represented by Indian tribes symbolized escape in the Early Republic, the plantation and
the "simple" agrarian life of the past emerged as a model of escape in the hurly-burly of the turn
of the twentieth century.
33. This is so obvious a claim that it is actually hard to cite directly. Nearly every historian
of North American slavery has understood not only that planters exercised despotic control over
their property, but that, when aggregated, that despotic control created something universal-a
southern slave society. Eugene Genovese wrote that slave society was "determined by particular
relationships of class power in racial form." EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 4 (1972).

34. Edgar Thompson, a mid-century historian of the "Old South," noted, "There are, or
have been, plantations with constitutions, laws, courts, jails, policemen, and even monetary
systems of their own. At one time in the history of the South the planter possessed the power of
life or death over the members of his plantation." Edgar T. Thompson, Purpose and Tradition in
Southern Rural Society: A Point of View for Research, 25 SOc. FORCES 270, 271 (1946).
35. In the words of Phillip Curtin, "[T]he owner not only controlled his work force during
their working hours, he also had, at least de facto, some form of legal jurisdiction. His agents
acted informally as policemen. They punished most minor criminals and settled most disputes
without reference to higher authority." CURTIN, supra note 6.
36. Planters not only represented the most readily accessible market for neighboring
farmers, but they controlled the local infrastructure either indirectly (through county
government) or directly. Roads and canals were increasingly privately held, meaning that nonelite free farmers were entirely dependent on the patronage of planters to conduct their business.
See Samuel C. Hyde, Jr., Mechanisms of Planter Power in Eastern Louisiana's Piney Woods,
1810-1860, 39 LA. HIST. 19, 31 (1998).
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arrangements under the control of the planter. 37 Crimes were
punished, benefits were allocated, labor was taxed, infrastructure was
built. Plantations walked and talked like local government.
Moreover, the planter elite happily accepted that the
plantations were the base unit of government. George Fitzhugh, the
famous pro-slavery firebrand, identified slavery as the essential police
power in the South. 38 Fitzhugh and his allies understood the
plantation system of slavery as an institutionalized patriarchy that
established a rational and sustainable system of government founded
on the Aristotelian model of the family. 39

This description helps to clarify the fact that the antebellum
plantation system in the South was a quasi-feudal system of
government. The plantation, like the manor, straddled the line
between public and private. The owner, like the lord, sometimes
resembled a family patriarch and sometimes resembled a head of
state. 40 In a feudal system, the manor was the most "local" site of
government, establishing the web of duties and prohibitions that
structured people's lives. 41 In the antebellum South, the pattern was
much the same.
37. On large plantations, the despotic power of the planter was often delegated in a formal
structure of governance with hierarchies established both among hired white employees and the
slaves themselves. Not only was governance organized hierarchically, it was frequently reduced
to a set of governing rules. Reducing plantation rules to a written code not only formalized
governance, but it also approximated a humanist commitment to "rule of law" as a constraint on
the owner's absolute power. "By creating rules for plantation governance-regardless of how the
rules were followed-slaveholders assured themselves that their plantations were established on
principles of humanity." MARGARET ABRUZZO, POLEMICAL PAIN: SLAVERY, CRUELTY, AND THE
RISE OF HUMANITARIANISM 143 (2011).

38. Fitzhugh, writing in a chapter with the title "The World is Too Little Governed,"
proclaimed that "[s]lavery is an indispensable police institution" that effectively regulates the
lives of Southerners slave and free. FITZHUGH, supra note 2, at 97-98.
39. "There cannot be enough [government to support religion or morality] without domestic
slavery, because, in its absence, men are placed in competitive and antagonistic positions toward
each other." GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY

200 (Richmond, A. Morris 1854). In other words, free labor leads to self-interest, which erodes
the bonds of communal government. Id. Laura Edwards helps to make sense of how the family
model operated as a part of and a link to government. "In law, slavery fit within a system of
governance that linked individuals to the state and defined their legal rights through their
positions within households. Heads of household assumed moral, economic, and legal
responsibility for all their domestic dependents, including African American slaves, white wives,
and children." LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
58 (2015).

40. Of course, in the case of the slaveholder, there were many instances where the owner
was actually both father and master.
41. See Susan F. French, Traditionand Innovation in the New Restatement of Servitudes: A
Report from Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119, 122 (1994) ("In the feudal period, local government
was organized on the manorial level, with the grant of manor lands carrying rights and
obligations of governance over the inhabitants.").
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2. The County Oligarchy
Across most of the antebellum South, the county was the
lowest level of local governance recognized by the state constitutionthere were no town governments. With some variation, most county
governments were modeled on the Virginia county court system.
Under that system, counties were governed by justices of the peace
who served on the county court. These justices were picked by the
governor (or legislature) from a slate of names submitted by the
sitting justices. 42 The effect of this was that the planter elite held a
nearly dynastic control over the reins of power at the level of both the
plantation and the county. 4 3
While Jeffersonians bemoaned the control that planters
exercised over county governments, the planter elite themselves
celebrated it. From their perspective, the county courts protected both
property rights and good government. Proprietary localism protected
the status quo by ensuring that a surfeit of democracy would not lead
to redistribution. The elite rejected the egalitarianism of Jacksonian
democracy, instead adopting the position that in genteel democracy
some men were fit to govern and others were fit to be governed. 44 For
example, Virginia-native Chief Justice John Marshall believed that
"the people, left to themselves, are not capable of self- government." 45
Putting local government in the control of "only our most intelligent
and respectable citizens" meant a protectionist rather than

42.

See Robert Wheeler, The County Court in Colonial Virginia, in TOWN AND COUNTRY:

ESSAYS ON THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 111, 113-14

(Bruce C. Daniels ed., 1978). Wheeler describes the county government system before the
revolution, but the fundamentals of the system remained in place after independence.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 15, at 10:
43.
The justices of the inferior courts are self-chosen, are for life, and perpetuate their
own body in succession forever, so that a faction once possessing themselves of the
bench of a county, can never be broken up, but hold their county in chains, forever
indissoluble. Yet these justices are the real executive as well as judiciary, in all our
minor and most ordinary concerns.

44. Fitzhugh drew a connection to classical republicanism:
The ancient republics were governed by a small class of adult male citizens, who
assumed and exercised the government, without the consent of the governed. The
South is governed just as those ancient republics were. In the county in which we live,
there are eighteen thousand souls, and only twelve hundred voters. But we twelve
hundred, the governors, never asked and never intend to ask the consent of the
sixteen thousand eight hundred whom we govern.
FITZHUGH, supra note 2, at 354.
45.

ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 4 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 488 (1919). Marshall understood

that a change from the "self-perpetuating County Court system" to one in which new justices
were appointed by the Governor "without regard to recommendations of the local justices . ..
would have destroyed the traditional aristocratic organization of the political, social, and to a
great extent the economic, life of Virginia." Id.
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participatory localism. 4 6 John Randolph stated the case bluntly,
speaking against proposed reforms in 1829, when he argued that if
reformers should "succeed in introducing the newest, theoretical, pure,
defecated Jacobinism into this Commonwealth" it would "inflict[ ] a
deeper wound on Republican Government[] than it ever experienced
before." 47
B. Communitarian Ward Republics
Those who opposed plantation localism were no more concerned
with the rights of slaves than the planters were. Instead, they were
concerned with the unequal power that planters wielded over white
yeomen farmers. They argued that the planters' grip on local power
left little room for small farmers who owned few or no slaves to
participate in government. They wanted to redistribute that power by
changing the structure of local government. Jefferson's proposed ward
system was the tool that they proposed.
1. The Ward System
In Thomas Jefferson's view, the ideal base unit of government
was the "ward republic," a small, self-governing, local entity modeled
on the New England town. 48 Although he first proposed a version of
the ward system in 1779,49 Jefferson did not elaborate it until 1815,
when a movement was afoot to rewrite the Virginia Constitution. In
1813, he wrote to John Adams saying that his wards were modeled on
the New England town and that they represented "those portions of
self-government for which [the people] are best qualified."5 0 They
would be "the most fundamental measure for securing good

&

46. Alex B. Long, An Historical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and
West Virginia, 18 J.L. & POL. 691, 736 (2002) (quoting Philip P. Barbour speaking at the Virginia
Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830).
47. Id. at 737 (second alteration in original).
48. Jefferson famously wrote that New England towns "have proved themselves the wisest
invention ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise of self-government, and for its
preservation." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 15, at 13.
49. Committee of Revisors, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 526, 526-35 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
50.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct., 28, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 221, 225 (Henry Augustine Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor
Maury 1854). Jefferson hoped that self-governance would lead to political solidarity,
remembering the opposition that he had faced during his presidency from town meetings. He
hoped that in their wards, southerners would "act in mass, as your people have so often done,
and with so much effect by their town meetings." Id. at 226.
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government, and for instilling the principles and exercise of selfgovernment into every fibre of every member of our commonwealth."5 1
Jefferson was not the communitarian that John Adams was,
but he believed deeply in participation. In outlining his plan in
advance of the 1820 Virginia constitutional convention, he argued that
"by making every citizen an acting member of the government . . [the
ward system] will attach him by his strongest feelings to the
independence of his country, and its republican constitution." 52 For
Jefferson, participation was about legitimacy. The problem with
plantation localism was not simply that it was protectionist, but that
it was undemocratic and thus risked resistance. The wards, by
contrast would "be pure & elementary republics ... . In this way we
shall be as republican as a large society can be; and secure in the
continuance of purity in our government, by the salutary, peaceable
and regular control of the people." 5 3

2. Wards and Plantations
While Jefferson and his allies never proposed that a more
communitarian local government would upset slavery, their opponents
saw the way that the argument tended. If plantation localism was
illegitimate because it excluded some white citizens, what about the
millions of slaves who were governed despotically by their owners? 54

&

51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 17, 1814), in 6 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 299, 301 (Henry Augustine Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor
Maury 1854).
52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 15, at 12-13. The
mechanics of Jefferson's plan were relatively simple: (1) "Divide the counties into wards" that
were small enough that every citizen could attend a meeting in person if called upon. (2) Give
those wards control over "all things relating to themselves exclusively." These functions included
a justice, a constable, a militia, a school, roads, care for the poor, etc. (3) Relatedly, give each
ward control over how to cast votes for congress and president. (4) Build the county government
from this foundation by assembling the justices chosen by each ward into a "county court" that
would serve as a legislature on matters of common county concern. This newly subdivided ward
fit neatly into Jefferson's proposed hierarchy of divided government power. He believed that
government should be broken into four layers of authority: national, with responsibility over "all
concerns foreign and federal"; state; county republics, "for the duties and concerns of the county";
and ward

republics,

"for the

small,

and yet numerous

and interesting

concerns

of the

neighborhood." Id.
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 1816), in 4 MEMOIRS,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302, 302 (Thomas Jefferson

Randolph ed., London, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1829).
54. John Randolph said as much during the debates over the new Virginia constitution in
1830. He threatened that giving more power to poor (i.e., non-slaveholding) whites would mean
that "in less than twenty years you would have a Bill brought into the House of Burgesses for the
emancipation of every slave in Virginia." WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD
DOMINION: VIRGINIA AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM 1824-1861, at 69 (1996).
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The protection of slavery trumped any grievances that yeomen
farmers might have. And so in 1830, when Virginia did finally call a
constitutional convention, Jefferson's ward system was never even
given serious consideration.5 5 By 1837, when George Tucker wrote the
first biography of Jefferson, he described the ward system proposal as
a romantic scheme of the great man's late life unsuited to the real
world of politics.

56

Although the ward system was relegated to an idealistic
impossibility, it remained a reference point for those who opposed
proprietary plantation localism. In 1827, a Jacksonian newspaper in
Kentucky critical of elite control of local government published a set of
excerpts from Jefferson's letters urging the state to consider a version
of the ward system.5 7 In 1848, the governors of North Carolina and
Virginia each proposed a version of Jefferson's ward system to replace
the county courts.5 8

55. Id. at 70. Lewis Summers, a westerner, proposed that the reform be considered, but the
committee "dismissed the motion without serious discussion." Even though the plan was a nonstarter at the convention, that did not mean that it had no political support. The Kercheval
letters were first made public in 1826, after Jefferson's death, when Kercheval himself sent them
out around the state for publication. As the 1829-1830 Virginia convention was being
contemplated and gathering, the letters were republished by papers around the state expressing
implicit (and sometimes more explicit) support for the reforms he put forward there. See Mr.
Jefferson, U.S. TELEGRAPH (Washington, D.C.), Apr. 28, 1829, at 5 (noting somewhat cryptically
that "republication at this time, we consider very opportune . . ."); Mr. Jefferson and the
Convention, VIRGINIA ADVOCATE (Charlottesville, Va.), May 16, 1829, at 2 (publishing the letters
without comment); Mr. Jefferson and the Convention, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, July 7, 1829, at 2
(suggesting a line of opposition to reforms and exhorting the delegates at the convention to "read
these letters with some attention, and see how far Mr. Jefferson's views are 'in sentiment' with
theirs, on what should be the fundamental laws of Virginia").
56.

See GEORGE TUCKER, 2 THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, THIRD PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES 390-93 (London, Charles Knight & Co. 1837). Tucker was a member of one of
Virginia's first families, and though he was a westerner of a sort (he lived in the Shenandoah
Valley), he was also a main-line moderate elite. He had become famous in 1824 when he
published a novel, The Valley of Shenandoah, which was the first novelistic account of life in
Virginia (and one of the first examples of the genre of the "Plantation Novel"). Although he was
not an aggressive defender of slavery, he was a chronicler and defender of the status quo. It is
thus unsurprising that his critique of Jefferson's plan was that it threatened to make politics too
reactive and volatile. He argued that
[h]ad this ward system prevailed throughout the Union a year or two since, Georgia
would have expelled the Cherokees from their natal soil by force, and provoked a civil
war with the general government... . [Aind what may not Virginia have done after
the Southampton massacre [Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831], or any other southern
State, since the incendiary proceedings of northern fanatics towards their slaves?
Id. at 393. In other words, Tucker saw the ward system as a kind-of license for mob rule and the
old county system as a tool for maintaining a moderate peace in the face of political furor.
57. Right of Suffrage, COMMENTATOR (Frankfort, Ky.), Sept. 29, 1827, at 3.
58.
See Convention Bill up in Orange, RALEIGH DAILY TELEGRAM, July 29, 1871, at 2
(presenting the governor of North Carolina's recommendation to adopt the ward system);
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None of these ideas took root, and plantation localism not only
persisted, but as the sectional conflict heated up it became enshrined
as an integral part of the "southern way of life." A fauxcommunitarian and quasi-democratic rhetoric developed defending
plantation localism as a defining element of southern identity. As the
South became increasingly anxious about northern encroachment and
the existential threat to slavery posed by abolitionists, southerners
defended their protectionist system of local government. Plantation
localism represented them not because it was democratic (the elites
explicitly disavowed this) but rather because it responded to a
crescendo of racial and outsider resentment. The North was coming to
free the slaves and impose racial equality. Under threat, the "southern
way of life" came to overlap with the idea of southern "selfgovernment." South Carolina's declaration of secession made the link
explicit: Lincoln's election and Republican control of the federal
gtvernment meant that "[t]he slaveholding States will no longer have
the power of self-government, or self protection, and the Federal
Government will have become their enemy."59 Proprietary localism-

in the form of plantation localism-channeled that resentment and
made the protection of the status quo a higher virtue than political
participation.
C. Localism at War
Secession and the Civil War both consolidated and generalized
attitudes about localism. 60 In the North, leading up to the war and for
the duration, the communitarian localism of the town was fired with
martial energy. Towns gathered in meetings to denounce the Fugitive

William Smith, Governor's Message, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, Dec. 8, 1848, at 3. Smith proposed to
break the counties into smaller districts and noted that
this scheme of districts is, in principle, nothing but the township system of many of
our sister States; nothing but the ward system of the illustrious Jefferson; but the
hundred system of the great Alfred. It is a system sanctioned and approved by ancient
and modern experience; which I can with great confidence recommend to your
favorable consideration.
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA 19 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd Public
Printer 1848).
59. DECLARATION OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION
OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION ¶25 (1860).
60. The relationship between antebellum localism, the sectional crisis, and the outbreak of
the Civil War will be the subject of future work. My intention here is merely to trace the rough
outlines as they relate to the story during Reconstruction.
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Slave Law of 1850,61 and towns became the primary centers for
military recruitment, with companies within regiments often being
filled out entirely by residents of a single town. 62 As anyone who has
visited a town green in New England can attest, that sense of local
endeavor was expressed after the war in the form of monuments to the
towns' slain.
The war also increased southerners' commitment to localism.
"[T]he rhetoric of secession and its affirmation of decentralized
authority in law and government gave new meaning to existing
expectations of local control." 63 Indeed, because plantation localism
had protected the power of the planters and fostered a sense of
freedom from the demands of external government, it was not
uncommon for local communities to reject the commands of the
Confederate state and federal governments and act on their own as
they saw fit. 6 4

The conventional story is that the Civil War defeated a robust
conception of states' rights and thereby increased the power and scope
of the federal government. This story has structured our
understanding of Reconstruction and Redemption by focusing
attention on the battles between the states and the federal
government. But even as the sectional conflict did ratchet up state
loyalties, it ratcheted up local loyalties even further. Rather than
decrease the importance of localism, the sectional strife during the
war further entrenched ideas about northern and southern "ways of
life," which were rooted in localism. These strongly held cultural
commitments to communitarianism (the New England town) or
proprietary localism (plantation localism) drew clear distinctions
between the sections and increasingly attributed the ills and
depredations of the other section to those fundamental local
distinctions. As the next Part shows, northerners attributed the
economic troubles of the South to their backward planter aristocracy.
In turn, southerners saw northerners as grasping capitalists whose
61.

See,

e.g.,

GILBERT

NASH,

HISTORICAL

SKETCH

OF THE TOWN

OF WEYMOUTH,

MASSACHUSETTS, FROM 1622 TO 1884, at 82 (Weymouth, Weymouth Historical Soc'y 1885) (noting
resolutions passed in 1850 and again in 1854 opposing the Fugitive Slave Law).
62.
Individuals had an incentive to recruit new soldiers for new companies so that they
could become officers. This meant that men with local influence often sought to raise companies
within a given town. The result was that towns went to war together, often under local
command. See, e.g., NED SMITH, THE 22ND MAINE VOLUNTEER INFANTRY IN THE CIVIL WAR: A
HISTORY AND ROSTER 34 (2010).

63.
EDWARDS, supranote 39, at 49.
64.
See id. at 59-62 ("White Confederates thought that legal authority rested-at least in
part-with them. That presumption was derived from a tradition of local governance, which
accommodated the customs of particular communities.").
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towns were little better than factories to be run efficiently with no
regard to the good life.
With localism so closely identified with a collective sectional
way of life, it was no surprise when northern reformers targeted local
government as a fulcrum for a wider project remaking the South.
Thinking that plantation localism was defunct and that a new
localism could and must be built for the South, a few idealistic
Yankees in North Carolina, Virginia, and South Carolina proposed to
replace the old poisonous plantation with "the wisest invention ever
devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise of self-government,
and for its preservation." 65 Nor was it a surprise when, in response,
southerners resisted that threat and fought to preserve the localism
that they knew and identified with.
II. To REMAKE THE SOUTH
I don't care a rag for "the Union as it was." I want to fight for the Union "better than it
was." Before this is accomplished we must have ... a thorough and complete revolution
and renovation. This I expect and hope. For this I am willing to die-for this I expect to
die.

66

A. The Fabricof Southern Culture and Yankee Local Government
When the Civil War ended in 1865, it left behind a set of
institutional design questions on a scale as large, if not larger, than
those that faced the newly freed colonies after independence. Through
a brutal exercise of military force, the Civil War had forced the
emancipation of millions of slaves and thrown the entire social fabric
of the South into disarray. Plantations had been seized, the most
valuable assets of the rich had turned from property into citizens, and
the foundations of the old political order were crumbling. The sheer
carnage of the war led many to see it as a millennial moment of
transformation. Not only had the southern "way of life" been
shattered, so too had the northern attitude of appeasement and
compromise. In this conquered chaos, it was not so unreasonable to
imagine that a whole new southern "way of life" could be established.
The seceding states of the Confederacy were in a state of
existential limbo. They had retained their cartographical borders
(mostly 6 7 ), but their status as part of the union was uncertain. It is
65. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 15, at 13.
66. Letter from Albion W. Tourg6e to Brothers of the Union (Jan. 1863) (on file with the
Chautauqua County Historical Society & McClurg Museum, Albion Winegar Tourg6e Papers
#454).
See, e.g., West Virginia.
67.
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easy to forget in hindsight just how open the question of what to do
with the conquered territory was. The dominant view, represented by
President Johnson and held in common by many conservative
southerners, was that the war had vindicated Lincoln's original
position that the states could not secede, meaning that they should
return to the union on much the same terms as they had left it.68 The
leading radical politicians in Washington disagreed. Massachusetts
Senator Charles Sumner and Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus
Stevens were the leading radical voices in their respective chambers.
Both argued that, although the states had no right to secede, the
result of secession and northern victory was that the states no longer
existed as they had before the war. 69 As a result, they argued
Congress had sweeping authority to remake the Confederacy on
whatever plan it saw fit.
Behind these theories of congressional power was the radicals'
utopian vision that the end of the war presented a "golden moment" of
opportunity to perfect the government of the United States. 70
Thaddeus Stevens was among the most strident advocates of this
carpe diem approach. His argument rested on the principle that the
states were no longer entitled to recognition as they had been before
secession and were instead "an alien enemy to be dealt with according
to the

laws

of war."71

From

this

foundation,

he

urged

that

Reconstruction seek to do more than mend the torn fabric of the union.
He argued for a total reform of southern society: "The whole fabric of
Southern society must be changed, and never can it be done if this
opportunity is lost ...
Heretofore, it had more the features of
aristocracy than democracy. The Southern States have been
despotisms, not governments of the people." 7 2

Naming the South an aristocracy was not radical in itself, but
proposal for reforming southern government was. Stevens

his
68.

See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,

at 179 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988) (describing President Johnson's
position that "secession had been null and void, the states remained intact, and Reconstruction
meant enabling them to resume their full constitutional rights as quickly as possible").
69. Stevens saw the seceding states as "conquered provinces," subject to wide federal
control through military victory. Sumner agreed on the extent of control, but argued that the
states had committed "suicide" when they seceded, forfeiting their former sovereign status. See
id. at 232.
70. Id. at 230 ("[T]he driving force of Radical ideology was the utopian vision of a nation
whose citizens enjoyed equality of civil and political rights, secured by a powerful and beneficent
national state.").
71. Thaddeus Stevens, Reconstruction; Hon. Thaddeus Stevens on the Great Topic of the
Hour. An Address Delivered to the Citizens of Lancaster, Sept. 6, 1865, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1865, ¶ 7.
72. Id. 1 44.
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proposed that plantations should be broken up and that wealth and
land should be redistributed to freed slaves and veterans. 73 Stevens's
intentions were explicitly framed in terms of creating the conditions
for democratic self-governance in southern government. "How can
republican institutions, free schools, free churches, free social
intercourse, exist in a mingled community of nabobs and serfs: of the
owners of twenty thousand acre manors with lordly palaces, and the
occupants of narrow huts inhabited by 'low white trash'?"74
Stevens's catalog of "republican institutions" was instructive.
Free schools, free churches, and free social intercourse all point to his
Yankee view of politics and society founded on the bedrock of town
government. Moreover, these all emphasize the communitarian
virtues of the town by making gathering in school, in church, and in
town meeting, essential to Republican virtue. In fact, Stevens could
have been paraphrasing John Adams's four pillars of New England
and
society: "[T]own meetings, training days, town 'schools,
ministers." 75 Stevens's goal was virtuous northern Republicanism, and
his blueprint, implicitly, was the New England town.
From long before the beginning of the war, northern radicals
had contemplated reforming the South by transforming it to emulate
New England. In 1841, William Lloyd Garrison (the famous and
acerbic abolitionist editor of The Liberator and sometimes advocate of
northern secession) argued that the sectional conflict would only end
when "the genuine principles of New-England industry and enterprise
are permitted to take root in the soil [of the South.]" 76 This note was
picked up by William Seward in his famous "Irrepressible Conflict"
speech in 1858. Seward argued that there were two systemsnorthern free labor and southern slavery-and that they were
antagonistic. The logic of the claim that "the United States must and
will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slave-holding nation, or
entirely a free-labor nation," suggested that the answer to the conflict

73. Stevens estimated that by confiscating the land of the largest landowners, the federal
government would have 394,000,000 acres of land at its disposal. After giving each freedman
forty acres, the remaining 354,000,000 acres would be divided up into farms to be sold (veterans
would be ideal purchasers), and the proceeds would go to veterans' benefits. Id. TT 19-20. ("But
we propose to confiscate all the estate of every rebel belligerent whose estate was worth $10,000,
or whose land exceeded two hundred acres in quantity. Policy if not justice would require that
the poor, the ignorant, and the coerced should be forgiven.").
74. Id. 1 44.
75. Id. Training days and town meetings suggest a version of "free social intercourse" both
in the militia and in political conversation.
76. William Lloyd Garrison, Executive Session, LIBERATOR (Bos., Mass.), Sept. 10, 1841, at
2.
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was imposing Yankee virtue on the South.7 7 Once the war broke out,
the chorus of sectional chauvinism intensified, and the calls
transplanting Yankee institutions in the South became more strident.
Capitalists imagined that Yankee free labor ideology would
revolutionize southern agriculture: "[T]he whole cotton country must
be permeated and regenerated by New England men and by New
England ideas."7 8 Mainstream political reformers imagined a new,

healthy, free-labor Republicanism founded on Yankee principles: "The
blighting influences of slavery in the South will be supplanted by the
thrift, the enterprise, and the free institutions of the North."79

Talk of northernizing the South generally proceeded at a high
level of generality, but the New England town was always lurking
below the surface as an ideal. Because the town was the building block
of Yankee virtue, remaking New England in the South could not
happen without the town. Henry Ward Beecher drew this connection
as early as 1863. "The frame work of New England society is the most
intensely moral of any on the earth.... There is a true democracy in
New England. A New England township, I think, is the only literal
political democracy on the globe."8 0 Joel

Parker, a conservative

professor at Harvard Law School agreed in 1866, arguing that the
towns "have been the arterial system of New England, through which
has circulated the life-blood which has invigorated, sustained, and
strengthened her ....

77. William H. Seward, Sec'y of State, The Irrepressible Conflict 1 10 (Oct. 25, 1858).
78.
Edward Atkinson, The Future Supply of Cotton, 98 N. AM. REV. 477, 485 (1985).
Atkinson goes on to imagine the picture more fully. Id. at 495-96:
Then picture this land as it shall surely be a few years hence,-the land divided, if not
by confiscation, then by the operation of the ordinary working of our system of land
tenure . . . the freedmen developing, as at Port Royal, the desire to become landowners, and enabled to become so by the large profits which the next few years must
yield to all cultivators of cotton,-villages established,-the Yankee school-teacher
everywhere at work,-the men in the fields,-the women in their own homes,-the
children at school,-none clad now in coarse hand-made fabrics, but in New England
manufactures purchased and paid for with their own money ... and everywhere the
church spire pointing its finger toward heaven, leading up to the one Infinite Power
which is now guiding this nation through sorrow and tribulation ....
79. Article VI. The Re-election of Mr. Lincoln, 22 UNIVERSALIST Q. & GEN. REV., Jan. 1865,
at 90-91.
80.
On Wednesday Evening, February 4th, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher Delivered a
Lecture on "New England": Before the Boston Merchantile Library Association, of Which the
Boston Journal Furnishes the Following Report, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Mar. 5, 1863.
81. Joel Parker, The Origin, Organization, and Influence of the Towns of New England, 9
PROCEEDINGS MASS. HIST. SOC'Y 14, 16-17 (Jan. 1, 1866). A year later, Massachusetts's
Governor Bullock echoed this sentiment when he argued that New England "owes too much of its
happiness and renown" to the towns "that have trained the people in democratic habits and
principles." The Importance of Independent Municipalities, EVENING POST (N.Y.), June 5, 1867,
at 3.
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The problem with southern politics and culture was that it was
aristocratic and thus proprietary and protectionist. The solution was
local democratic participation geared toward gathering the community
together to make progress together. In 1865, Orestes Brownson
argued that the lack of towns in the South contributed to the fact that
"the rights and interests of the poorer classes of persons have been
less well protected." 82 But Brownson was an optimist writing at the
end of the war, and he predicted that as peace established itself,
slavery melted away, and as the southern aristocracy broke up, "the
New England system, in its main features, is pretty sure to be
gradually introduced, or developed. . . ."8
During the war and at its close, a militant vindictiveness began
to appear in the calls for bringing Yankee values south. As President
Johnson's Presidential Reconstruction threatened to allow southern
states and Confederate leaders back into the union, 84 and as reports
reached the North about the oppression of freed blacks under the new
Black Codes, 85 radicals began to demand the fruits of conquest.
Wendell Phillips argued that northern victory meant the "North
making over the South in its likeness, till South Carolina gravitates
by natural tendency to New England." 86 Veterans were even more
strident and blunt. In 1866, in Pittsburgh, radical Union veterans
gathered in a convention to insist that the conquest that came from
Union victory not be squandered. General James Cochrane made the
rough terms clear: "[T]here can be no lasting peace until the South is
chained down, revolutionized, Yankeeized."8 7
At the nexus between idealism and militancy, northern
missionaries in the South during and after the war took up the work
of Yankeeizing their new homes with vigor. One of the first
comprehensive experiments with reconstructing and northernizing the
South took place on the Sea Islands of South Carolina, which had been

82. 0. A. BROWNSON, LL. D., THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 274-75 (N.Y., P. O'Shea 1865).
83. Id. at 275.
84. See generally FONER, supra note 68, at 177-227 (discussing the failure of presidential
reconstruction).
85. The Black Codes were a set of state laws passed in the former Confederacy to define the
extent of the freed men and women's new freedom. Id. at 199-202. They were, in essence, an
effort to create a new set of regulations, which would limit the freedoms of the black workforce
and preserve the plantation system to the maximum extent possible. Id. Freed slaves might be
nominally free, but they would be economically constrained and tied to their plantations under
penalty of criminal sanctions. See id. (discussing the enactment of and reaction to Black Codes).
86.

MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS,

THE ORDEAL OF THE REUNION: A NEW HISTORY OF

RECONSTRUCTION 58 (2014).
Cashdollar, supra note 18, at 338.
87.
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liberated by Union troops at the beginning of the war in 1861.88 The
Sea Islands and their large rice plantations had been abandoned by
planters, leaving thousands of former slaves suddenly free. Idealistic
northerners, adopting the name "Gideonites," came south to conduct
the "Port Royal Experiment." Their northernizing agenda was clear:
they came armed with "John Adams' maxim[:] that civil society must
be built up on the four corner-stones of the church, the school-house,
the militia, and the town-meeting." Using these cornerstones, the plan
was to "build there a new New England, replete with Yankee
institutions." 89
After the Civil War ended in 1865, a new wave of northerners
came south with much the same ideology as the Gideonites. The
Yankee soldiers had conquered, and they were followed by Yankee
teachers: "Wherever the Yankee soldier has tramped the Yankee
schoolmarm

will

teach.

. .

.

[A]nd

the

work

of Yankeeification

proceeds."90 And then the Yankee soldiers returned to seek their
fortunes and remake the South.9 1 These idealistic, militaristic, and
occasionally opportunistic northerners would become critically
important framers of the new constitutional orders of their adopted
states. By 1868, the hopes for a national program of land and wealth
redistribution to northernize the South by force had faded. The
compromise of Congressional Reconstruction put everything aside
apart from suffrage and basic civil rights as recognized by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 92 The

88.
For a full and rich account of this experiment, see WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR
RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT ROYAL EXPERIMENT (1964).

89. Id. at 229.
90. A Summer Visitor, The Mean Yankees at Home, 23 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 61, 62 (1869).
91. These were the maligned "carpetbaggers" who were cast by southerners and the early
historians of Reconstruction as "jackals" who "went south after the Civil War to take advantage
of the Negro vote, gain election to office, and get rich by plundering the Southern people."
RICHARD NELSON

CURRENT, Foreword to THOSE TERRIBLE

CARPETBAGGERS,

at xi (1988).

Beginning at the turn of Reconstruction historiography in the middle of the twentieth century,
the old negative image of the carpetbagger has been largely resuscitated, but it still carries
baggage. See K. Stephen Prince, Legitimacy and Interventionism: Northern Republicans, the
"TerribleCarpetbagger,"and the Retreat from Reconstruction, 2 J. CIVIL WAR ERA 538, 539 (2012)
("If we accept, with Current and Tunnell, that the carpetbaggers were not actually that terrible,
we are still left to account for the phenomenon that Tourg~e described-the widespread, nearly
universal, northern acceptance of the "terrible carpetbagger" stereotype during the latter years
of Reconstruction.").
92.
The details of the process to reach this compromise would require far more space than I
can devote here. In short, Democrats and moderate Republicans were initially opposed to
suffrage (especially as applied to northern states). Radicals were forced to give ground in a
number of areas. Charles Sumner had wanted to mandate public education as a condition for
readmission, Wendell Phillips and Thaddeus Stevens wanted to mandate land redistribution. In
the end, Congress readmitted southern states with ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
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stage was set for former Confederate states to reenter the union if
they met the conditions laid out in the Reconstruction Acts. Those
were, primarily: to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and draft a new
constitution allowing for equal suffrage 93
But if the hope of a national program to remake the South died
in 1867, it lived on in the states that had been instructed to draft new
constitutions. Although the delegates who gathered in the
constitutional conventions of 1868 across the South were not bound to
act beyond the requirements of the Reconstruction Acts, many were
eager to. These delegates were a mixture of northern radicals,
southern unionists, and freed blacks-many of whom remained
committed to the radical project of remaking the fabric of southern
culture. The terms of this remaking were clear: reform governance
and overturn the aristocracy. Campaigning for his seat as a delegate
at the North Carolina convention, Albion Tourg6e wrote: "Shall the
new State have an Oligarchy or a Republic? An Aristocracy or a
Democracy? .

.

. Do you choose to govern yourselves or be ruled by

those who still crave the name of 'master'? Will you be free men or
[S] erfs?" 9 4

The new constitutions went well beyond the minimal
requirements of Congress. They mandated public education, judicial
and penal reform, electoral reform, and many more "northernizing"
innovations. 95 The Yankee influence was clear in state after state.
Given this influence, it is not at all surprising that the township
experiment was part of the project in North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia. It was precisely the kind of structural reform that states
across the South were turning to.
B. The Township Experiments
The Yankee idealists who wrote the New England town into
the constitutions of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
shared a common belief: "[T]he township system .

.

. secures powers in

and a promise (before the Fifteenth Amendment was passed) that their constitutional provisions
guaranteeing equal suffrage would never be repealed. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 407-22

(1964).
93. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, §5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (laying out framework for equal
suffrage and the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. ALBION W. TOURG9E, To the Voters of Guilford (1867), in UNDAUNTED RADICAL: THE
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALBION W. TOURGtE 26-27 (Mark Elliot & John David

Smith eds., 2010).
95. See FONER, supra note 68, at 320 ("[Mlany articles [were] copied directly from the
North.").
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the hands of the public to regulate their own concerns. The local
management of the township dethrones the old aristocratic order, and
educates the people to self-government." 96 The theory was simple:
townships create political engagement, which forms new political
communities, which, in turn, train citizens in the arts of selfgovernment and create the circumstances for economic and cultural
progress. 97 If the project of remaking the South was to remake the
southern "way of life" from the ground up, the township experiment
was a linchpin.
Although the vision was largely the same in each of the three
states, the legal histories were quite different for structural, political,
and contingent reasons. In Virginia, the township experiment was
written into the constitution in 1869 but required legislative action
before the reforms were set in motion. By 1870, the political winds had
shifted enough that the proposed reforms never really took hold. In
1874, the experiment was ended by constitutional amendment. In
South Carolina, the experiment had an even shorter life. Townships
were required by statute in a special legislative session in 1868, giving
content to a constitutional amendment that had been adopted to
enable the reform. Nearly as soon as the borders were drawn and
elections begun, opposition to the reforms emerged from across the
political spectrum. By 1870, the township statute had been repealed
and the experiment ended. 98
It was in North Carolina where the experiment was most fully
implemented, and where, as a consequence, the opposition to it was
most robust and illustrative. In North Carolina, the township
experiment was written into the constitution in 1868.
It was a principal bone of contention in the battles between the
radicals and conservatives for the next seven years. The
communitarian idealism of the reformers met increasingly stiff
resistance from conservatives fueled by both outsider and racial
resentment. This resistance slowly coalesced around a new proposal:
eliminate the danger of the townships by giving the state government
control over local government. Over the angry protest of Republicans

96.
Edward Daniels, The Township System, DAILY STATE J. (Alexandria, Va.), Oct. 29,
1872, at 2. There is no indication that there was any coordination between the framers of the
constitutions in these three states.
97.
In the words of Daniel Corbin, the architect of the township experiment in South
Carolina, when responsibility for governance is "in the hands of the people ... the public interest
are excited, the people educated, and the country developed and improved." The Last Sensation.
Metropolitan Police Tyranny. A Protest Against Repealing the Township Law, CHARLESTON
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1870, at 1.
98.
I will summarize the history of the experiment in these two states in more detail below.
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and reformers, this was how the township was finally written out of
the state constitution in 1875. Within two years, the state had used its
new power to erase the townships from the map.
1. The Township Experiment in North Carolina
a. Albion Tourge
The story of the township reform in North Carolina begins
(and, to some extent, ends) with Albion Tourg6e. It was Tourg6e who
wrote and advocated for the constitutional language that created
townships in North Carolina. It was Tourg6e who fought to preserve
the townships for nearly a decade. And it was Tourg6e who blamed the
failure of the entire project of Reconstruction on the failure of the
township experiment there. 99
Tourg6e was a self-labeled carpetbagger who perfectly
embodied the complex idealism and opportunism of the Yankee
reformer: part missionary, part capitalist, and part militant. Born in
the Western Reserve of Ohio (a bastion of New England culture in the
West) 100 in 1838, Tourg6e split his childhood between Ashtabula
County and his aunt's house in western Massachusetts.10 1 In both of
these places, local government meant the model of the New England
town.102

99. In his 1880 novel, Bricks Without Straw, Tourgde wrote bitterly that "the township
system, with its free discussion of all matters, even of the most trivial interest to the inhabitants;
that nursery of political virtue and individual independence of character, comporting, as it did,
very badly with the social and political ideas of the South-this system was swept away . . . ."
ALBION W. TOURGtE, LL.D., BRICKS WITHOUT STRAw 461 (N.Y., Fords, Howard & Hulbert 1880).
And with it, so too was self-governance, democracy, and the promise of a new political order in
the South. Id. at 461-63.
100. The Western Reserve acquired its name because it was originally granted to
Connecticut under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Until 1800 it was known as "Connecticut's
Western Reserve." MARK ELLIOT, COLOR-BLIND JUSTICE: ALBION TOURGtE AND THE QUEST FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO PLESSY V. FERGUSON 47 (2006). Unlike southern Ohio,
much of which had been granted to Virginia and settled by southerners, the Western Reserve
was mostly settled by New Englanders who established towns and town meetings modeled on
their home states. Untethered to the conservative "Brahmin" aristocracy of New England, the
Western Reserve evolved into a hotbed of radical egalitarian thought by the mid-nineteenth
century. A combination of religious revivalism, abolitionism, and mediated Jacksonian populism
meant that the Western Reserve was one of the most radical and far left regions in the North.
See id. at 49 ("Both western New York and Ohio's Western Reserve developed a distinct
egalitarian culture that was fiercely committed to the self-improvement of the individual. . ..
[T]hese regions would become Radical Republican strongholds providing the strongest support
for the most radical legislation of the Reconstruction era.").
101. Id. at 50-53.
102. In fact, the settlers in the Western Reserve were reviving an old model of the New
England town that no longer existed (or perhaps never had existed). They were utopians and
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Unlike many of the Yankee voices of Reconstruction, Tourg6e
was neither a veteran of the abolition movement nor a member of the
northern elite. Before the war, he shared the baseline radical politics
of his neighbors, but, at least by his own account, he was a man of
letters only obliquely interested in politics-he was not yet a
radical. 103 It was his experience in the Civil War that transformed him
into a crusading radical and idealist. 104 When he witnessed slavery in
practice for the first time while convalescing from an injury on a
Unionist plantation in Kentucky, Tourg6e came away appalled: "My
brain

throbs-my

blood

boils! .

.

.

I

cannot

forget

what

has

occurred."10 5 This experience, in concert with Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation (issued that same fall), seems to have marked a turning
point for Tourg6e. He had entered the war a unionist, but he had
become a radical advocate not only for ending slavery, but for ending
the entire political culture which harbored it. In a letter to his old
fraternity brothers written in early 1863, Tourg6e wrote: "I dont [sic]
care a rag for the 'the Union as it was.' I want and fight for the Union
'better than it was.' Before this is accomplished we must have . . . a
thorough and complete revolution and renovation." 106
With these words, Tourg6e staked an early claim to the vision
that Stevens would lay out two years later. He was a remarkably

communitarians following Adams's idealized model. They "constructed villages formed after the
English model with a defined town center, a church and a school . ... This ideal depended on
shared values and communal networks to bind them together in a single purpose where
Protestant ethics and principles of enlightenment sustained one another." MAE PELSTER,
ABOLITIONISTS, COPPERHEADS AND COLONIZERS IN HUDSON & THE WESTERN RESERVE 20 (2011).
103. In the midst of his political emergence in 1868, Tourgde reported that while he was "an
ardent disciple of [abolitionist] Josh Giddings and others of that ilk. I . . . was still such an
egregious ass, as to waste my youthful breath hurrahing for that cowardly and weak-kneed
concern known as the old Whig party." ELLIOT, supra note 100, at 55. Tourg6e's most recent
biographer, Mark Elliot calls this characterization into question, noting that Giddings was one of
the leaders of the Republican Party that essentially destroyed the Whig Party and speculating
that Tourg6e's politics were really more radical before the war than he let on. Id. at 55-56.
104. Although initially reluctant to enlist during the frenzy after Fort Sumter, Tourg6e did
join the army in the spring of 1861. Id. at 76-77. Just months later, in the disastrous first Battle
of Bull Run, Tourg6e was nearly paralyzed, injuring his spine in a way that would trouble him
for the rest of his life. Id. at 78-81. For months, Tourgde thought that he would never be able to
walk again, and he despondently gave up the hope of participating in the war effort and began to
study law. Id. at 81-84. But by the summer of 1862, he had recovered enough to return to action
as a lieutenant in a newly formed regiment from Ashtabula County in the Western Reserve that
he had helped organize. Id. at 84. Drawn from the most radical part of the North, Tourgde's new
regiment was filled with abolitionists, and as they went south, they repeatedly found themselves
in the situation of resisting army orders to return the "contraband" slaves who flocked to the
army lines seeking freedom. Id. at 84-88.
105. Id. at 88.
106. Id. at 89.
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consistent advocate for revolution and renovation for the rest of his
life and his zeal was evident in the course he took after the war.
In October of 1865, Tourg6e moved to North Carolina with his
new wife Emma and two of his old college classmates to recover from
his war injuries, seek his fortune, and help rebuild the South. 107
Tourg6e settled in Guilford County, near Greensboro, where he leased
a fruit tree nursery and began to practice law.108 Almost as soon as he
arrived, Tourg6e identified himself as a friend of the freed blacks and
white unionists. 109 He quickly fell in with the interracial radical
community that was busily establishing an infrastructure of Union
League chapters across the county and the state. 110 By 1866, Tourg~e
had been chosen as one of North Carolina's delegates to a convention
of "southern loyalists" in Philadelphia. When he returned home in
1867, he was an emerging Republican hero and an instant villain to
conservatives."'

I tell Tourg6e's story in this much detail because it is in many
ways the archetypal carpetbagger tale. The township experiment, in
all of its manifestations, was the product of a specific kind of Yankee
idealism that Tourg6e embodied. Radicals like Tourg6e found
themselves in a unique position during the early years of
Reconstruction in the South. Just two years removed from the
mundane life of an Ohio lawyer, Tourg~e and his compatriots were
protagonists in the project of framing new constitutions for their
adopted states. That old goal of "revolutionizing" the South was no
longer speculative. It seemed immediately possible.

107. Tourgde's lingering back injury ultimately forced him to resign from his regiment in
December of 1863 and return home to Ohio and his fianc6e Emma. Id. at 98. A reluctant civilian,
Tourg~e returned to his legal study, passed the bar, and began to practice law. Id. at 103-04.
108. Id. at 105.
109. See id. at 106-07 (describing Tourg6e's relations with both southern unionists and
freedpeople upon his arrival in Greensboro). The first clients that Tourgde took upon arriving in
North Carolina were native unionists, many of whom had claims against the federal government
for confiscation and destruction of property during the war. He also not only took black clients,
but also took an active interest in the freedpeople's struggles. He hired many freedpeople to work
in the nursery and started up a school for freedpeople in Greensboro.
110. Id.
111. The Democratic paper in Tourgie's adopted hometown modified an old epithet to attack
him for his speech in Philadelphia: "While Mr. Tourgee may resemble 'rotten mackerel by
moonlight[-he stinks and he shines],' we would respectfully suggest that he only stinkscertainly he does not shine." An Important Question Settled, GREENSBORO PATRIOT, Sept. 14,
1866, at 1. The Patriot attributes the saying to John Randolph-the same Randolph who called
Jefferson's wards "defecated Jacobinism." PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE
CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 532-33 (Richmond, Samuel Shepard & Co. 1830).
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b. North Carolina'sConvention
In the fall of 1867, North Carolina was preparing for a
convention to draft a new constitution to meet the requirements set
out by the Reconstruction Acts. The convention was a radical project,
and the old governing elite disparaged and ignored it. The
conservative paper in Wilmington voiced a common view when it
called the gathering the "Gorilla Convention" and proclaimed it
illegitimate. 1 12 In part because conservatives largely declined to
participate (or were barred from the ballot by their Confederate
military service), the cohort of delegates who were chosen to gather in
Raleigh the winter of 1867 was dominated by radicals. 113 The
convention itself was dominated by Tourg6e.
At twenty-nine, Tourg6e was the youngest delegate to the
convention, but he proved to be an energetic and ubiquitous advocate
for his ideas and, by sheer will and activity, managed to have a hand
in nearly all of the lasting reforms written into the new constitution.
Tourg6e brought to his work his vision of a renovated and
revolutionized South, and the resulting constitution showed it. His
influence on the proceedings was so pervasive that for many years in
retrospect some referred to the 1868 convention as the "Tourg6e
Convention."1 14 He was instrumental in framing new language
requiring universal manhood suffrage, judiciary reform, penitentiary
reform, legal code reform, and the establishment of universal
education.1 15 Taken together, these provisions both set out a new suite
of positive rights for all North Carolinians and sought to create an
empowered electorate to protect them. 116 The key engine of creating
that electorate was a new system of local government conducive to an
inclusive communitarian vision for the state-Tourg6e was there too

112. Tourgee, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Jan. 11, 1868, at 2.
113. The ambivalence of conservatives is evident in an article from the Greensboro Patriot

advancing the candidacy of a few conservatives as alternatives to Tourgie, but at the same time
urging that the convention itself was something to be resisted. See Candidates for the
Convention, GREENSBORO PATRIOT, Nov. 8, 1867, at 2 ("Let no man stay at home and thereby fail

to vote for H[arris] and M[endenhall], and if possible, thereby defeat A.W. Tourgee & Co. Those
who have resolved to vote against the calling of a convention should not hesitate to vote for the
Conservative ticket . . . .").

114. ELLIOT, supranote 100, at 128.
115. Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr., The Past as Prologue: Albion Tourgde and the North
CarolinaConstitution, 5 ELON L. REV. 89, 102-03 (2013).
116. Id. at 98 ("The political linchpins of these guarantees depended upon an electorate who
would support these rights and support the election of officials who believed in these guarantees,
and would act to implement and enforce them.").
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as the chairman of the committee responsible for the township
experiment.1 17
Although the experiment was central to the overall reform
project, it was not the most prominent or controversial topic at the
convention. The sheer number of reforms that the convention
considered over a three-month span diluted specific opposition to
particular policies.11 8 Conservative opposition was fueled by outsider
resentment ("northern oppression") and racial resentment (the
"Gorilla Convention"), but the complaints tended to be more
generalized than specific. Tourg6e's committee did not present its
report and recommendation on the townships until the third month of
the convention.1 19 The discussion of the committee's report took less
than one day. Just two days after the report was presented and
discussed, it passed the convention and became part of the draft
constitution. 1 20 All indications suggest that, although there was
opposition to the plan in the form of nay votes (fourteen out of 101),
there was very little vocal opposition on the convention floor. 121
The plan that Tourgie's committee proposed had thirteen
sections and, with minimal alteration, subtraction, and addition, was
the plan that was written into the final document as Article VII:
"Municipal Corporations." The first two sections began with the
existing structure, defining the governance structure for counties
going forward. 122 Sections 3 and 4 laid out the process by which the
county officers would supervise the surveying, creation, and naming of
the "convenient districts" that the county would be divided into. These
new districts, upon approval of the General Assembly, would "have

117. See Special Order, DAILY N. CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 6, 1868, at 2 ("Tourgee,
chairman of the committee, said since the old county court system had been abolished, the
committee had reported a plan proposing a Board of Commissioners to attend to county taxation
and other public matters.").
118. This new constitution was a "break as sharp, if not more so, than that marked by the
Independence Constitution itself." JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A

REFERENCE GUIDE 13 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1993).
119.

JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA AT

ITS SESSION 1868, at 314 (Raleigh, Joseph W. Holden 1868) [hereinafter "JOURNAL"] (beginning
discussion of the report starting on March 5, 1868).
120. Id. at 352-53 (passing the "third and final reading" on March 7, 1868).
121. Those nay votes included twelve of the thirteen conservatives at the convention. Not a
single conservative voted for the township plan, and only two Republicans voted against it. Id.
122. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, §§ 1-2. There were to be biennial county elections to
choose county officers: a Treasurer, Register of Deeds, and five commissioners. Those officers
would exercise "general supervision and control of the penal and charitable institutions, schools,
roads, bridges" etc. of the county. The original proposal at the convention included the officer of
Sheriff and "one or more Coroners" in the list of county officers. These offices were eliminated
during the debate over the bill. See JOURNAL, supra note 119, at 315.
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corporate powers for the necessary purposes of local government and
shall be known as townships."1 23
Tourg6e's plan sailed through the convention with almost no
opposition. 124 With little attention and almost no direct opposition,
North Carolina had replaced its old plantation localism with a new
communitarian model uncompromisingly drawn from the mind of a
Yankee idealist.
c. OutsiderResentment: The Conqueror'sLocalism
Although the township experiment passed through the
convention with little resistance, it almost immediately became a
target for conservative opposition to ratification. In the weeks after
the convention, the townships became a focal point for conservatives'
123. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, §§ 2-4. Having created these townships, Section 5
outlined the three officers that would make up the "Board of Trustees" of each township: a Clerk
and two Justices of the Peace. Id. § 5. Elected biennially, the Trustees would have control over
municipal matters, including taxes, finances, roads, and bridges. In addition to the Board of
Trustees, there would also be biennial elections for a separate School Committee, which would
have control over township schools. This provision was among the most altered from the original
committee report. Tourg6e's original proposal had called for annual elections (on the Jeffersonian
and New England models), but the convention settled on biennial elections. Additionally,
Tourg6e's initial proposal had been to give the Board of Trustees authority over the schools, but
as the education provisions of the constitution evolved, he and the convention settled on creating
a separate School Committee. See JOURNAL, supra note 119, at 315-17. There is some ambiguity
in the constitution respecting whether the new school districts would be coextensive with the
new townships. Article IX called for dividing counties up into school districts but did not specify
that those districts need be coextensive with the new townships. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX,
§ 3. But Section 5 of Article VII clearly states that the School Committee will be elected by the
township. Id. art. VII, § 5. Sections 6 through 9 laid out the powers and limitations of the new
municipal governments. Id. §§ 6-9. Section 6 required the trustees to assess taxable property in
the township, Section 7 prohibited all municipal corporations (towns, cities, and counties) from
incurring debt or collecting taxes for purposes beyond necessary expenses without a majority
vote of the residents. Id. §§ 6-7. Section 8 prohibited drawing any money from a county or
township treasury except "by authority of law." Id. § 8. Section 9 required that all municipal
taxes be uniform and ad valorem. Id. § 9. Sections 10 through 12 outlined the process by which
local governance would proceed during the process of defining the new townships and holding
elections. Id. §§ 10-12. First, the county officers would be elected and begin their work ten days
after the new constitution was ratified. Id. § 10. While the new townships were being defined,
and before elections could be held, the Governor was instructed to appoint justices of the peace in
each county to keep the machinery of government working. Id. § 11.
124. It was the last provision, which, despite the fact that it had little bearing on the
structure of the new system, drew the most attention. Section 13 prohibited municipalities
(including townships) from collecting taxes or otherwise using funds in order to pay any debt
"contracted, directly or indirectly, in aid or support of the rebellion." N.C. CONST. of 1868, art.
VII, § 13. Although the conservatives at the convention did not go so far as to openly oppose this
last provision, four committee members declined to endorse it and when it came before the
convention as a whole, the conservatives moved to amend it to allow towns to repay debt that
"indirectly" supported the rebellion. This motion failed on a near party-line vote. See JOURNAL,
supra note 119, at 318-19.
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deeply felt resentment of northern oppression: "The general
characteristics of our old customs are to be changed[ ]" and replaced
with "Yankee customs." 12 5 Outsider resentment came hand in hand
with a turn toward a more proprietary local government that provided
fewer services and assessed fewer taxes. Townships "require[d] a
complexity of machinery and officers, and an amount of expense,
wholly unadapted to the wants, tastes and education of our people." 12 6

Between the claim that the townships were not "adapted" to the South
and the argument that southerners wanted less local government,
conservatives began to construct a story about what a native local
government system would look like. The intricacies of the Yankee
town were all tied up in its communitarian soul. Northerners wanted
their towns to employ people and provide services. Perhaps more
importantly, they wanted townships to be training grounds for
democratic participation. Townships would be "schools where the
lessons of statesmanship will be learned [and] which may be
afterwards displayed in the government of the State." 127 Southerners,
by contrast, wanted their towns to employ few people and do little
apart from protect the freedom of property owners to do what they
wanted. Democracy was neither a primary nor a secondary value.
Instead, conservatives argued for a localism that was native and
suited to the South, which left the political and social order intact.
In the back and forth about the township plan, a fundamental
struggle that would define Reconstruction politics emerged. Radicals
and Republicans saw the defeated South as a land without functioning
institutions of government. Those who had been excluded from
political power (freedmen, poor whites, yeomen) would be trained to
rebuild their governments by participating in their new local
government. This process would forge a new electorate and citizenry
that would move beyond the elite plantation politics that defined
slavery. Southerners, and especially conservative southerners who
had an affinity for the old plantation system, agreed that they did not
have functioning institutions of government, but blamed that on being
conquered and colonized. They were not interested in forming a new
electorate with former slaves and "the mob." They were not interested

125. The New Constitution, WILMINGTON J., Mar. 13, 1868, at 2. The proof of this was in the
language: "New offices and new names are to be introduced, in accordance with the customs of
the Northern States." Id.
126. Thoughts for the People. No. 7. Fifteen Solid Objections to the Proposed Constitution!,
SEMI-WKLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 28, 1868, at 1.
127. JOURNAL, supra note 119, at 486. This defense of the constitution was distributed and
printed widely across the state. See, e.g., Address of Messrs. Rodman and Gahagan, WKLY. N.C.
STANDARD (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 8, 1868, at 1.
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in having a local government "machinery" that would train a new
polity. Rather, they wanted a local government that would protect the
old political order to the maximum extent possible.
d. Racial Resentment: The New Integrated Townships
Despite opposition, the new constitution was ratified in a
special election in April of 1868.128 Almost immediately, county officers
began the sometimes painstaking work of laying out the new
townships. 129 The first township elections were set for the fall of 1869.
As the townships transitioned from theory to practice, the shape of the
arguments over the township system began to evolve. Seemingly for
the first time, conservatives observed that the townships gave new
political power to black citizens, sometimes resulting in the election of
black officials. This triggered the first wave of racial resentment
leveled against the townships. At the same time, perhaps because of
the threat to white supremacy, conservatives began to advocate more
active participation in local politics than they had previously done.
They argued, on the one hand, that the new local governments were
illegitimate both as engines of racial egalitarianism and outsider
domination, but on the other hand, that as a matter of political
expedience, they should be captured to keep power out of the hands of
those who would undo the southern way of life.
The fear of "negro domination" through the town began to
emerge before the elections. In a letter addressed to the
(predominantly Republican) "White Men of Western North Carolina,"
an anonymous "Springfield" noted that by helping ratify the
constitution, western white men have "let your white brethren be ...
enslaved" at the hands of the coming crop of "negro township judges,"
trained in the diabolical ideologies of the "league," who will
appropriate white property without cause. 130 In this way,
conservatives used racial resentment to undermine the legitimacy of
the new townships. Not only would black elected officials be
unqualified, but their very presence would strip away local identity
128. See ORTH, supra note 118, at 13.
129. The process of laying out the new township borders took a long time. Tourg6e's own
Guilford County did not designate new townships until October-and there the borders were
coextensive with previously existing tax districts. See Townships in Guilford, PATRIOT & TIMES
(Greensboro, N.C.), Oct. 15, 1868, at 3. Meanwhile, in Wake County (where the state capital
Raleigh is), the townships had still not been adequately laid out in time to hold township
elections in 1869-a year later. See Township Elections-Wake County, DAILY SENTINEL
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 17, 1869, at 2.
130. Springfield, To the White Men of Western North Carolina, SEMI-WKLY. SENTINEL
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 23, 1868, at 3.
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and local control. 131 The alarm became both a critique of the township
and a call for electoral participation as conservative papers threatened
that if conservatives do not turn up to vote, "the control of affairs must
be reposed in ignorant negroes. . . ."132
As would be true for much of the process of Redemption, racial
resentment was both a rallying cry for electoral participation and a
call to limit government once control was regained. Pragmatic
conservatives partially abandoned their disdain for the new system in
the effort to win local elections and use the new form as a tool of
wresting power away from the "radical" governing party. As
conservatives sought public office, an undertone of validation for the
system crept into their rhetoric. The Raleigh Sentinel proclaimed,
"[1Much depends for the security and peace of society upon the
intelligence, the virtue and promptness of the magistracy. If the
Justices of the Peace are wise and good men, much irritation,
litigation and lawlessness will be avoided."1 33 Holding his nose, John
Gatling exhorted voters to "accept a situation which he finds to be
inevitable," and turn out to vote. Subtly acknowledging that the
ultimate goal remained to do away with the new system, Gatling
emphasized that "it is not wise, because an office happens to be of low
degree, to regard it as unimportant. It is in the 'small affairs' of life we
make our greatest mistakes." Interestingly, Gatling defended his
electioneering by recognizing the virtues of local control:
The lowest officers are brought in most immediate contact with the people, they are the
company officers of the political army, upon whose humble shoulders rest our strongest
hopes for success, at whose hands the greatest good may be accomplished, or whose
1 34
corruption, villainy and petty tyranny may drive our people mad ... .

Importantly, Gatling's view of local control was not
communitarian. His local officials were representatives of the
interests of the people, not the people themselves. 135 They were
131. The Wilmington Journal suggested that
every "Township" in the State, in which there may be a large negro majority, be called
"Holden" [after the hated Republican governor].... So that the name shall be
beslavered with the negro, now and forever, and the one shall not be nientioned
without suggesting, by the most natural and intimate association, the other.
Our Raleigh Correspondence, WILMINGTON J., Feb. 19, 1869, at 4.
132. The paper went on: "[O]r worse, a few malignant and carpet bag whites in every respect
more depraved and worthless than their black brethren." The August Election, TARBORO'
SOUTHERNER, Jul. 22, 1869, at 2.

133. Elections in August, WKLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), July 29, 1869, at 2.
134. John Gatling, To the Voters of Gates County, Without Respect to Party or Color, DAILY
SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), July 8, 1869, at 2.
135. Gatling's rhetoric was consistent with the rhetoric of the Democratic Party which, after
the war, had become increasingly supportive of decentralization. In 1867, decrying Republican
centralized government, Horatio Seymour railed against putting the South under the "almost
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protectors, not democrats. In the context of the politics of racial and
outsider resentment, the terms of that protection were clear. The goal
was not to participate in politics to build civic engagement; it was to
participate in order to protect against the civic engagement of blacks,
carpetbaggers, and scalawags.
When the township elections came, the results were somewhat
inconclusive. Some conservative papers put a positive spin on the
election, noting that many of the towns across the state elected
Democrats. 136 But most conservatives perceived the elections to be a
Republican victory and either bemoaned conservative apathy 37 or
returned to the ex ante position that townships were either an
oppressive outrage or an annoying triviality. 138 Despite the generally
positive outcome for Republicans, the staunchest proponents of the
experiment saw danger in the elections. In elections across the state,
they observed that conservatives had managed to co-opt the process
savage" "black rule." But in the same speech, he praised the "township system of government" as
the core of a well-run political system. Praising the power of local control to protect communities,
Seymour emphasized that the townships "allow the people of the localities to take care of those

things which most concern them, and concerning which they have the most intelligence." The
Masses Moving. Great Meeting in Brooklyn. Eloquent Speeches by Hon. Henry C. Murphy and
Gov. Seymour, ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 26, 1867, at 2. Democrats would continue to praise the
township throughout the 1870s, despite the pitched partisan battles in the South. Townships in
the North were constructed as the bedrock of a decentralized government and a bulwark against

perceived Republican nationalization and consolidation. In 1870, a Democratic senator in Ohio
called the township system "the brightest example of democratic government" and credited New

England with setting it. The Campaign. Mass Meeting in Brainard's Hall-Able Speech of
Senator A.G.

Thurman, CLEVELAND DAILY PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 28, 1870, at 4. Elsewhere in

Ohio, Democrats picked up the call in even more strident terms. In 1873, the Democratic
CincinnatiEnquirer called the New England town meeting "the germ of the Republic, the purest
democracy born on earth." The New England Town-Meeting, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 8,

1873, at 4. Months later, campaigning for Governor of Ohio, Democrat (and old copperhead)
William Allen proclaimed that "[t]here is only one perfect democracy, the New England town
meeting. The people in that little democracy make and execute the laws so far and fully as it is
possible for them to do so." The Danger and the Hope of the Hour, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 1,
1873, at 4. In 1875, the Enquirer reiterated that the system is "the germ of our system of
Government .... It is democracy perfected." The New England Town Meeting, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Apr. 16, 1875, at 4. In 1878, the Enquirer expanded the argument to suggest that the
National Democratic Party was "born in the New England town-meeting, which knew no

monopoly, which tolerated nothing but perfect equality." The Ohio Democracy National-The
Eastern Democracy Sectional, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 28, 1878, at 4. Later that year, the
claim became even more grand-entwining the town meeting with the "great reform movements

in this country" including, surprisingly, abolition. That "RagBaby," CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June
29, 1878, at 4.
136. See The Township Elections, NEWBERN J. COM., Aug. 12, 1869, at 2.
137. See Our Township Election, ASHEVILLE NEWS & MOUNTAIN FARMER, Aug. 13, 1869,
at 2.
138. The virulently conservative Henderson Index proclaimed that it was "not accustomed to
despair for as small cause as a township election going against us." We Fear the Township
Election. . . . , HENDERSON INDEX, Aug. 20, 1869, at 2.
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either through putting forward candidates who should have been
disqualified by their Confederate service or by suppressing black and
poor white voters. Thus, despite what seemed like a promising
beginning to the experiment in operation, men like Tourg6e warned
that the elections revealed the seeds of the demise of the township if
white .supremacy was allowed to operate freely in the political
process. 139
e. Conservative Resentment v. Democracy:
The Fight to End the Townships
The 1869 local elections did not resolve the existing conflicts
over the township experiment, but they did increase the urgency of
conservative opposition. Almost as soon as the election was over,
leading conservative voices began to call for a new constitutional
convention to "fix" the abuses of the 1868 constitution. Abolishing the
township was one of their core objectives. 140
For the first time, conservatives brought outsider resentment
and racial resentment to bear as part of a single argument. Taken
together they combined to form a more generalized conservative
resentment against Reconstruction government. This resentment
bolstered the argument that the townships were wasteful, oppressive,
and illegitimate. The Sentinel called the system a "yankeeism" and an
excuse to "provide offices and place for carpet-baggers, dishonest
scalawags and lazy negroes." 141 The solution to all of these problems
was to dismantle the communitarian experiment and replace it with
antebellum proprietary localism. "Let this ignoble and oppressive
system be blotted out also, and the good old system of our fathers
restored." 142

139. Tourg6e was an opponent of the township elections themselves, claiming that they were
invalid because many conservatives who were disqualified from holding office under the new
constitution were running and being elected (and in some cases being certified as elected).
Leading up to the election, Tourg6e had warned that they were going to be a "farce" and he
staunchly opposed allowing disqualified candidates to serve. Who Appoints Justices of the Peace,
GREENSBORO PATRIOT, Aug. 26 1869, at 2. In his new role as circuit judge, he argued that the

governor's interim appointees should hold onto their offices "until there shall have been a loyal
election held in the township." Who Appoints Justices of the Peace, GREENSBORO UNION REG.,
Aug. 25, 1869, at 2.
140. See The Present Constitution, DAILY SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 22, 1870, at 2.
141. The Standard and the Commissioners, SEMI-WKLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 15,
1869, at 2.
142. Repudiation, TRI-WKLY. EXAMINER (Salisbury, N.C.), Oct. 6, 1869, at 2.
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During the elections of 1870, the townships remained a pivotal
issue. 143 Conservatives attacked Republican candidates on the grounds
that if elected they would defend the townships. 144 This tactic was part
of a conservative electoral surge that allowed them to take control of
the state legislature in 1870. One of the legislature's first acts was to
call for a new convention. 145 In the official conservative statement in
defense of the call for a convention, townships had prominent billing,
buoyed by strong conservative resentment.
The present county and township governments are intolerable evils. Their cumbrances
and inefficiency, their expensiveness, and the numerous avenues to peculation and
extortion which they open up, are grievances which have brought complaints and
remonstrances from all sections of the State. We believe there is an almost universal
desire for the restoration of the old County Courts, as the simplest, cheapest, and most
honest system of county government ever devised, and for the abolishment of the
14 6
existing system, with its wheels in wheels, crushing the people with burdens.

This official position went hand in hand with the overt racial
resentment that had emerged during the township elections.
Conservatives observed that there were white men "under negro rule
and domination" to convince other whites in the Piedmont and the
mountains (predominantly Republican regions where there were white
majorities) that they needed to vote to eliminate the township system
out of racial solidarity. 147 In all of their arguments, conservatives
steered carefully clear of arguments based in democracy. The county
courts were the most honest and native system, not the most
democratic.
In the face of these headwinds, Republicans in North Carolina
launched a vigorous defense of the township system. They began from
the position that the old county courts were not a viable option. They
were widely reviled, and those proposing them in place of the
townships offered no alternative but a return to a broken system. 148
143. Even those conservatives who were opposed to calling a general convention (both
because it was futile in the face of Republican opposition and because it might give radicals a
chance to do more mischief) remained committed to finding a way to undo the township system.
See Rowan, The Convention Question, OLD N. STATE (Salisbury, N.C.), Nov. 4, 1870, at 2.
144. The County Candidat[es], SEMI-WKLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 5, 1870, at 1.
145. See ORTH, supra note 118, at 15.
146. Legislative. Address on the Convention, TARBORO' SOUTHERNER, Feb. 16, 1871, at 2.
147. Coming Campaign, WLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 21, 1871, at 4. The full quote
is pretty inflammatory:
Will the white men of Wilkes and the mountains continue to vote the Republican
ticket with 80,000 ignorant negroes, to the ruin and oppression of their brethren in
the East? If they will, let them vote against Convention and move down to Halifax or
Granville, where they can enjoy negro rule to their hearts' content.
Id.
148. An anonymous writer to The Carolina Era made this point clearly, noting that the
opponents "object to the Township system, but propose no substitute. Are we to go back to the old
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The most forceful and widely distributed defense of the experiment
took the conflict between the old plantation localism and the new
townships head on. 149
The official Republican response to the call for a convention
posed a sharp challenge to those who were nostalgic for the "old
system." In short, it argued that the old system that conservatives
sought to return to was plantation localism-a system that was no
longer possible to achieve. The argument was that because there was
no way to go back, the only way was forward into the new political
reality-and that the township experiment was the best path forward.
The Republicans' first move was to rebut the framework of
outsider resentment. Conservatives may have argued that "townships
are a [Y]ankee invention, imported into North Carolina as a badge of
subjugation, and machinery of oppression," but in it was the township
that was the original model for Republican self-rule in North
Carolina. 15 0 On this account, the township was the original blueprint
for local government, one that "the growing influence of our slave
interest" had overturned in favor of the plantation. The argument was
direct: the planter elite "substitute[d] the slave plantation in place of

County Court system, with Justices appointed by the Legislature. .. and an accumulation of
costs ... ? They make no comparison of the costs of the two systems." Conservative, Letter to the
Editor, CAROLINA ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), June 8, 1871, at 3. Others used a version of the same
point to note the county court system was not some perfect nostalgic relic, and indeed that some
of the very same people who oppose the township system had tried to reform the county system
before the war. See, e.g., Convention Bill up in Orange, RALEIGH DAILY TELEGRAM, July 29, 1871,
at 2.
149. Some moderate voices sounded conciliatory notes, accepting the assertion that the
township system was flawed, but arguing that it should be fixed through legislative tinkering
rather than a full on convention. A moderate named Marcus Erwin was quoted by the Raleigh
Daily Telegram as arguing that the system was flawed but that "the Legislature had the power,
as it is the duty of that body, to correct every evil and abuse growing out of the system, except
the destruction of the system itself." The State Constitution, DAILY TELEGRAM (Raleigh, N.C.),
Feb. 23, 1871, at 2. In the same vein is a letter to the Telegram offering a tepid defense of the
system noting, on the one hand, that Jefferson advocated the system and that it works well in
the North and West, but on the other hand that "the upper classes here seem greatly averse to
this system, and it may be best not to force it upon them, if after a fair trial, they do not become
reconciled to it." Enquirer, The Convention, RALEIGH DAILY TELEGRAM, May 12, 1871, at 1. The
same Erwin also argued that the township system was nothing more than the realization (at
long last) of Jefferson's dream of Ward Republics. Marcus Erwin, The Constitution, CAROLINA
ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), June 27, 1871, at 1.
150. To the People of North Carolina, CAROLINA ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), June 20, 1871, at 3.
The township system was rooted in "twelve centuries [of English law that] have marked that free
society from which we have borrowed the substantial parts of our own." Not only did Tocqueville
and Jefferson regard "the township as a very corner stone of social liberty in this country," id.,
but so did the original founders of North Carolina, as evidenced by the fact that the township
was the original form of government in the colony.
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the township."15 1 In short, the township was native; it was the
plantation that was invasive and foreign.
The next move was to link outsider resentment to racial
resentment. White supremacy was linked to nostalgia for the old ways
through the remembered fantasy of racial domination. It was through
the desire for racial domination that plantation localism had become
normalized, creating "some yearning after the plantation, throughout
North Carolina. Many virtuous people no doubt struggle with the
forbidden appetite." 152 While the plantation was forbidden and
foreclosed by emancipation, white political and economic supremacy
was not. And so, the Republicans revealed, the real motivation behind
the attack on the townships was to reinstate the white supremacist
proprietary localism of the plantation by removing the new obstacle of
destabilizing communitarian townships.
The Republicans argued that this was precisely why the
townships were so important. They were the only hope for moving the
South beyond its defeat and the white supremacist ideology of slavery.
The township represented dynamic egalitarian community; it was a
"natural republic made up of neighbors ...
who ought to be, and
generally are, friends." 153 Implicit was the idea that the township
would promote racial cooperation and cultivate common interest.
Among neighbors, the Republicans argued, civic virtue and merit
would erase racial animus. 154 This cooperative meritocracy contrasted
sharply with old county court system that "depend[ed] upon the
reluctant favor of court house cliques." 156 The township thus replaced
a feudal patronage system dedicated to maintaining the status quo
with a form of participatory democracy designed to create social
mobility for white and black citizens. 156
The Republican response made the contrast between
communitarian and proprietary localism the center of the political
debate. Conservatives had focused on protecting a tradition rooted in

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. They argued that the townships "promote[d] public spirit [and] ... afford[ed], in the
organized circle of its neighbors, that machinery for forcing forward and upward local merit." Id.
155. Id.
156. This advancement argument had another valence too. Responding to conservatives'

arguments that townships worked well in the North where the population was denser and more
wealthy, the committee argued that it was the township system itself which allowed the poor and
sparsely populated North to grow in size and wealth: "[Tihey have grown to their present
prosperity under the influence of this institution." Id. This argument, incidentally, bears a
striking resemblance to Orestes Brownson's suggestion in 1865 that the township system is a
natural incident of a progressing society. See BROWNSON, supranote 82, at 274-75.
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white supremacy by retreating to the county courts. The Republicans
responded that retreat was both impossible and undesirable. Local
government should not preserve the broken past, but rather should be
the foundation of a functional future. The Republicans called
conservatives on their racial and outsider resentment and called on
the voters of North Carolina to seize the opportunity of a new,
egalitarian, and prosperous future.
Even if the Republicans had been somewhat circumspect in
their racial justice rhetoric, their opponents understood the argument
as an attack on white supremacy. Conservatives portrayed the
authors as race traitors. Their betrayal came in charging "late
slaveholders" with the "yearn[ing] to re-enslave the negro." 5

7

Without

actually repudiating this charge, the Sentinel asserted that it was
proof that the Republican leaders had betrayed all of their old white
political allies by spreading "calumny and falsehood" against them.15 8
In what has become a familiar move in the century since, racial
resentment politics was used to fight off any charge of racism.
The Republicans won this round. In the first week of August,
election day came and the public voted against holding a new
convention.159 Although the conservatives were gaining political
power, there was still a strong enough Republican political base in the
state to preserve the 1868 constitution for the moment. The township
had been central to the campaign, and the defeat of the convention
was, at least in some degree, an indication that North Carolinians
liked what they saw from the townships in their first years.
Even so, in the aftermath of the convention defeat, the
township experiment remained in the crosshairs, even as
conservatives focused their attention on amending the constitution
rather than calling a new convention.160 Recognizing that the strategy
of straight repeal had met resistance, a few voices began to formulate
a more nuanced plan that would leave the townships intact, but give
the conservative legislature the power to override local elections if
they did not like the results. This idea was floated in an explicitly
white supremacist letter from Caswell County in the fall of 1871:
We who live in negro counties, must appeal to the white men of the west to save us, so
far as they can, by electing judges and magistrates by the legislature. To have a

157. Phillipsand Holden, RALEIGH SENTINEL, June 22, 1871, at 2.
158. Id.
159. ORTH, supra note 118, at 23.
160. Licking its wounds, the Sentinel took solace in the fact that "[tihe legislature will no
doubt propose to relieve the people of townships." What Next?, DAILY SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.),
Aug. 20, 1871, at 2.
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township system, and the county and townships governed by negroes, is more than a
people should be required to bear. 1 6 1

Nothing came of this idea in 1871, but it would not be forgotten.
Instead, conservatives proposed an amendment that would
abolish Article VII of the new constitution nearly entirely and thereby
put matters of local government squarely in the hands of the
legislature. 16 2 Over the winter of 1871-1872, the legislature hashed
out the language of this proposed amendment. As promised, the final
wording proposed to essentially eviscerate the township system.
Township governments would be abolished, every mention of
"townships" in Article VII would be removed, and the state legislature
would be given power to design and control county governments. 163
The amendment was passed by the legislature in the spring of 1872
and stood ready to be presented to the voters.
The dynamics of this proposed amendment revealed the degree
to which appeals to plantation localism were rooted in protecting
against redistribution of power and property through the townships.
Conservatives had consistently called for a return to the county court
system, but rather than write that into the amendment, they instead
transferred the power over local government design to the state
legislature. There, elite conservative power seemed to be in relatively
stable control and thus insulated from the storms of local democratic
chaos. By making the legislature the guardians of local power,
conservatives entrusted the elites with the management local
governments for the protection of their interests-in precisely the
same way that they had before the war.
But the conservatives' hold on power at the state level was
more tenuous than they believed. In 1872, Republicans regained a
measure of power in the state elections, in no small part due a federal
crackdown on the Ku Klux Klan in the state and the attendant
diminishment of the Klan's influence over the electoral process. 164 The
Klan and other white supremacist vigilante groups had been
instrumental in conservative electoral gains through voter

161. Caswell, Letter to the Editor, SEMI-WKLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 30, 1871,
at 2.
162. The Democratic Party of North Carolina, Address of the Central Executive Committee,
CAROLINA ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 1871, at 1. Ironically, only Section 13, the section
forbidding repayment of confederate debts, would remain.
163. Amendments to the Constitution, N. CAROLINIAN (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 28, 1871, at 2.
164. OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGPE
190-91 (1965). Republicans actually won a majority of the popular vote, but gerrymandering
meant that they remained in the minority in the General Assembly.
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intimidation and violence.1 65 More fundamentally, the Klan
represented a direct localized expression of the racial and outsider
resentments that fueled much of the opposition to the townships.1 6 6
Linked as the Klan was to the movement to restore plantation
localism, it was not surprising that the Klan's decline helped to save
the township experiment, if only temporarily.167
The resurgent Republicans had wrapped themselves in the
township experiment as the "essential principle[] of the existing
constitution." 168 Against the rising tide of Redemption, Republicans
were increasingly adamant that they were fighting a holy war to
preserve democracy against a return to aristocracy and despotism.
This made communal and participatory localism more and more
central-doing away with the townships would be "essentially unRepublican." 1 6 9

f.

Demise

The reprieve was, indeed, brief. In 1874, opponents of
Reconstruction harnessed racial and outsider resentments and rode
them to a big electoral victory; conservatives retook command of the
legislature that they would not relinquish until the 1890s. 170 The
result was that the long-sought convention was finally successfully
called and set to convene in September of 1875. Unsurprisingly, the
townships were still a primary target. Conservatives pulled together
all of the strands of resentment in this final push. Townships were a
Yankee imposition "not in any way suited to the wants or desires of

SCALAWAGS:
NOR
CARPETBAGGERS
NEITHER
BAILEY,
RICHARD
165. See
OFFICEHOLDERS DURING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ALABAMA, 1867-1878, at 204 (2010).

BLACK

166. What we refer to collectively as "the Klan" was actually a collection of local groups
operating county to county with little centralized control. During the first years of
Reconstruction, the Klan operated much more like a patchwork of local white supremacist
governments in exile than a cohesive regional or national movement. See DAVID CUNNINGHAM,
KLANSVILLE, U.S.A.: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS-ERA KU KLUx KLAN 19-20 (2013).

167. Some constitutional amendments were proposed in 1873, but for once, the townships
were not in the crosshairs. "Every proposition looking to any change, interference or alteration,
whatever, in the Judicial, County or Township systems failed on a second reading."
ConstitutionalAmendments, DAILY ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 12, 1873, at 1.
168. The Amendments, NEW N. STATE (Greensboro, N.C.), Feb. 12, 1873, at 2.
169. Id.
170. 1874 was a disastrous year for Republicans across the South. Conservatives and
Democrats used the Civil Rights Act, pending in Washington, to play up racial resentment. This,
coupled with increasingly open intimidation and violence deterring black voters from the polls,
led to a region-wide shift away from Republicans and toward Redemption. See FONER, supranote
68, at 549-50.
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sparsely

settled

communities." 172 They were too expensive. 173 They threatened white
supremacy: "[O]ur people must submit to ignorant negro Magistrates,
who cannot write a warrant, negro school Committee men who can
neither read

nor write,

negro Constables

and Clerks." 17 4 These

arguments had a new tone of confidence. Conservatives were
explaining what they were about to do, not trying to convince anyone
to support them.
In contrast, Republican responses took up the defense of
townships in a much more urgent tone. Democracy and self-rule were
under immediate attack. Townships "might be, if properly carried out,
the true government of the people," and the conservatives were going
to destroy it just as "the people are beginning to get used to [it] and
like [it]."175 Other voices reminded voters of the "tyranny" of the old
county system that the Democrats proposed to reinstate. 176
The vehemence of the Republican rear-guard action bore some
fruit. When the election for delegates to the new convention was held,
Republicans shockingly achieved a near even split with the
conservatives.1 7 7 Republicans saw their comparative victory as a cause
for hope that the township system and the innovations of the 1868
constitution might be saved again.1 7 8 There was some substance to
this hope. Many of the more sweeping changes that conservative hardliners had dreamed of were made impossible by the heterogeneous
group of delegates. 179 Nevertheless, the convention would ratify thirtysix amendments to the 1868 constitution, including one that gutted
the township experiment and left it for dead.180

171. The North Carolina Convention Question Abroad, DAILY CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar.
31, 1875, at 2.
172. Courts, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), June 12, 1875, at 2.

173. See The Countersign-Passit Along the Line, GREENSBORO PATRIOT, June 30, 1875, at
2 (listing Democratic talking points and emphasizing the expense and waste of the township
system).
174. Why We Need a Convention, CAROLINA MESSENGER (Goldsboro, N.C.), July 8, 1875,
at 2.
175. The Township System..., N. CAROLINIAN (Elizabeth City, N.C.), June 2, 1875, at 2
(reprinting from the GreensboroNorth State).
176. Does Any Man.. ., DAILY CONST. (Raleigh, N.C.), July 13, 1875, at 2.
177. Albion Tourgbe was elected (in a very tight race) and so he was sent to frame a
constitution for his adopted state for the second time in seven years.
178. The Republican Era gloated that the elections represented a final chastisement of the
presumption of "Southern Democracy" and celebrated the dismay of the Democrats at the
election results. The Lesson of the North CarolinaCampaign, ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 19, 1875,
at 1.
179. See OLSEN, supranote 164, at 205.
180. See ORTH, supranote 118, at 16.
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Throughout the convention, conservative delegates offered a
host of amendments to Article VII. Plato Durham, one of the few
conservative veterans from the 1868 convention, proposed the most
straightforward attack: "Resolution declaring that article 7 of the
Constitution ought to be abrogated."1 8 1 Republican papers scoffed at
the "some half dozen propositions" saying "[d]own with the township
system." 18 2 Conservatives, they argued, seized on "[w]hatever tends to
limit and restrain the privileges of the people-to keep power from
their hands and make them the helpless victims of a corrupt and
ruthless aristocracy."1 8 3 They hated the township system because it
was "the nursery of freedom, the training school of independent voters
and the bulwark of general education."1 84 Conservatives, Republicans
argued, only wanted to "steal power from the people."18 5

Although the Republican defense did not save the townships
entirely, it did force the conservatives to take a more covert approach
toward repeal. Instead of eliminating any part of the existing Article
VII, the convention settled on proposed amendments that would leave
the township system standing, subject to one additional section. This
section gave the legislature plenary power to "modify, change, or
abrogate" the local government system of the state at will.1 86 In

practice, this provision meant that the conservative legislature had
flexible power over local government. Conservatives painted it as a
compromise. In counties where townships were safely controlled by
white conservatives, the township system (and direct election) could
be preserved. But in counties and townships under radical or black
control, the legislature could appoint township and county officials
itself. 87

The conservative "compromise" made the backdrop of racial
and outsider resentment all the more clear. Communitarian localism
181.

JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

HELD IN 1875, at 59 (Raleigh, J. Turner 1875) (hereinafter "J. OF N.C. CONST. CONVENTION").
182. Save the People's Constitution!, DAILY CONST. (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 13, 1875, at 2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. PoliticalIntegrity, ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 30, 1875, at 2.
186. The draft language is intentionally oblique: "The General Assembly shall have full
power by statute to modify, change or abrogate any and all of the provisions of this article and
substitute others in their place, except sections seven, nine and thirteen." J. OF N.C. CONST.

CONVENTION, supra note 181, at 252. Left immune to meddling were the requirements that no
municipality contract any debt unless necessary for its expenses, that all taxes should be ad
valorem, and that municipalities not be allowed to pay confederate war debts.
187. Townships were perhaps "burdens, even in the West, where intelligent white men are
in power," but "in the East, where ignorant negroes rule, they are a crying evil, a travesty upon
government, a stench in the nostrils of honest men." The Voice of the East, NEWBERN J. COM.,

Sept. 18, 1875, at 2.
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might be palatable where the community was dominated by white
elites committed to protecting the "old ways." But where democratic
participation meant electing blacks and outsiders, it must be quashed.
Republicans protested, calling the proposed change "inconsistent with
a democratic or republican form of government."18 8 But by 1875, even
the most radical Republican could see that resentment was a more
powerful force in southern politics than democratic egalitarianism.
The racialized appeal of "relief to the East"189 cut across party lines,
and appeals to black empowerment were not only losers, but
potentially career ending. Against this backdrop, Republican paeans
to the virtues of Republican self-governance were not enough to move
the political needle. 190
The constitutional amendments proposed by the 1875
convention were ratified by the voters of North Carolina in 1876.191
Conservatives celebrated the suite of amendments as a return to selfgovernment in North Carolina and an end to Reconstruction. 1 9 2 The
fact that the townships had been partially spared at the convention
briefly promised that perhaps in the West (in the mountain country
where Jeffersonians had always been strongest) the township might
survive in pockets. It was a short lived hope. In 1877, the legislature
acted on their new powers over the townships and stripped all
townships of their "very existence as corporate bodies." 193 All that
remained of the townships of 1868 were their borders, which outlined
little more than administrative memories. 194 Although the
Republicans had battled the bill in the House and forced a few
amendments, their consolations were quite minor: they forced the bill
188. J. OF N.C. CONST. CONVENTION, supranote 181, at 162.
189.

The

Work

Before

Us-The

Constitutional Amendments,

CAROLINA

MESSENGER

(Goldsboro, N.C.), Dec. 2, 1875, at 2.
190. 0. H. Dockery argued (from Jefferson) for the benefits of people having direct electoral
control over those who determine their taxes. Remarks of Hon. O.H. Dockery, of Richmond, on
the Ordinance to Amend Article VII of the Constitution (Municipal Corporation), in the
Constitutional Convention, Oct. 8, 1875, ERA (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 4, 1875, at 2. Tourg6e took the
more idealistic Tocquevillian tack arguing that townships are the schools of democracy and the
engines of economic progress. Judge Tourgie's Speech, UNION REPUBLICAN

(Winston-Salem,

N.C.), Oct. 12, 1876, at 2.
191. ORTH, supra note 118, at 16.
192. The other amendments largely limited the power of the statewide electorate. In
addition to retaking control over local government, the legislature also was given more control
over the judiciary while the number of executive offices was reduced. See id.
193. Wallace v. Bd. ofTrs. of Sharon Twp., 84 N.C. 164, 167 (1881).
194. In Wallace, The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the towns retained their
borders for the purposes of defining electoral districts, but that they were no longer corporations

and that they retained no powers. Id. ("If corporations still, whence do they derive their
existence, now that every clause in the Constitution which gave them being has been abrogated,
and every section of every act which could possibly be so construed has been repealed?").
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to make explicit that it could be repealed.19 5 In other words, they made
sure that the epitaph for the township system promised that it could
rise again.
The new regime not only did away with local control by erasing
the township, it also significantly curtailed participatory democracy at
the county level. Elections for county offices were all but abolished,
and the powers of the county commissioners were made subject to the
direct approval of the state-appointed justices of the peace. 196 The
result was that the state government had complete control over local
affairs and that the old elite political class reclaimed authority.
Putting localism in the hands of the state to protect the old way
of life was a new strategy aimed at a familiar goal. 197 Before the Civil
War, planter elites had controlled government at the plantation level,
the county level, and the state level. After the war, plantations no
longer existed in the same way, and the new electorate posed a
fundamental threat to local control. It made sense, then, that the only
way to reestablish something like plantation localism was to put local
government in the hands of the one branch safely controlled by the
elite and then use that control to keep the state out of the way of
private owners' business. This approach to localism was essential to
the dominant political program of the post-Reconstruction government
in North Carolina (and indeed across the South). "Retrenchment"
meant government should "spend nothing unless absolutely
necessary."1 9 8 Under this regime, returning counties to state control
made local governments protectors of an untaxed zone of freedom for

195. The Senate version of the bill made no such reference to its own ephemerality. See The
New County Government System, CHARLOTTE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 9, 1877, at 2.
196.

HELEN G. EDMONDS, THE NEGRO AND FUSION POLITICS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1894-1901,

at 118 (1951). Section 3
exercise [no] corporate
Assembly (and laid out
those new Justices the

of the act left townships intact but made it clear that they "shall have or
powers whatever." Section 4 made the Justices elected by the General
the complex system of starting up the new regime), and Section 5 gave
power to elect (from among themselves presumably) a county Board of

Commissioners that would have control over both county and township affairs. An Act to
Establish County Governments, CHARLOTTE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 2, 1877, at 2.

197. Here this history intersects with a broader national movement toward increased state
power over local governments. John Dillon wrote in his 1873 treatise that local governments
were creatures of state governments and that all of their powers were derived from and subject
to repeal by those states. As David Barron and others have noted, Dillon's rule was underpinned
by a deep commitment to a laissez-faire view of government: "Under the new approach, the

public's sole constitutional obligation was to avoid interfering with private market orderings."
David Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
487, 508 (1999). I leave a full accounting of the ways in which the retreat to state control in
North Carolina mirrored/heralded a retreat to state control in the North to future work.
198. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 58 (1971) (quoting
Governor Drew of Florida).
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property owners to operate in. 199 A new form of proprietary localism
was born in the image of plantation localism-but with a sharper edge
of anti-government rhetoric.
g. Aftermath
After the demise of the township experiments, Republicans
were a minority, but the Republican coalition did not cease to exist. A
strong minority of voters in North Carolina remained committed to
the township as their best hope for political and social change. In
1880, Rufus Barringer, Republican candidate for lieutenant governor,
addressed townships on the campaign trail. He hit all the old notes,
calling the system "the crystallized idea of all local selfgovernment.... It trains all classes in the great duties of reflection,
debate, and submission to defeat." By stripping this system away, the
Democrats had "robbed ...
[the people] ...
of their right to county
government" and suppressed "the voice of the people." 200 Barringer
predictably lost his election, but he was not the only public voice in the
1880s to keep the argument alive. 20 1
It matters that the flame of the township system was kept lit
because in the 1890s, Republicans had a brief political resurgence in
the moment of Fusion politics where populist opponents to the
essentially aristocratic Democratic establishment joined with the
remnants of the Republican party to take back the North Carolina
legislature in 1894.202 When the Fusion tickets took back the
legislature, democracy, self-rule, and dismantling the rule of the elites
took center stage. With that, Republicans returned to the county
government reform of 1875-1877 as one of their primary leverage
points. Along with the repeal of the (racist) election laws, the main
issue for Republicans was "the repeal of the present county

199. See id. at 58-59. Eric Foner roughly agrees in one of his few mentions of the township
experiment. By taking power from local majorities, North Carolina "effect[ively] restor[ed] the
oligarchic antebellum system of local government." FONER, supra note 68, at 591. What Foner
critically elides, however, is the fact that the old oligarchic structure was rooted in the
plantation, while the "return" required some escape from government altogether in the absence
of the plantation. See id.
200. The Republicans at Yadkinville, UNION REPUBLICAN (Winston-Salem, N.C.), Aug. 12,
1880, at 2.
201. The occasional letter, speech, or op-ed would remind Republicans of the travesty on
democracy that the Democrats had committed in 1875. See, e.g., The County System and the
Election Laws, UNION REPUBLICAN (Winston-Salem, N.C.), Feb. 14, 1884, at 2.
202. See generally EDMONDS, supranote 196.
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government laws, placing the affairs of the people back in their own
hands, where they should be." 20 3
In 1895, the fusion legislature passed a new county
government bill that ousted the current county officials and
magistrates and reestablished popular election for all of the offices. 204
The township system itself was not reinstated, but popular control
was restored. For a moment, communitarian localism in the form of
participatory democracy held sway again. Blacks and poor whites
united to challenge proprietary elite control. As it had in 1868, a shift
in local power promised to unsettle the status quo-and resentment
politics quickly took shape. As soon as the new system was in place,
calls for "relief for the East" from the specter of black political power
immediately rang out. 2 0 5 The new county system and the modest black
electoral success under it became a rallying point for an explicit "white
supremacy" campaign, 206 which helped sweep Democrats back into
power in 1898.207 Back in power, the Democrats rewrote the county
government law again, this time making the white supremacist
compromise explicit. Rather than making all county and town officials
chosen by the legislature, the new law singled out the counties most at
risk of "negro rule" and gave the legislature power to choose officers in
those counties, while leaving the majority white counties with
majority elections. 208
While Republicans failed to reestablish the townships and
failed to achieve racially egalitarian local government, the new
compromise was a shift away from elite proprietary localism. As poor
and rich whites agreed on the terms of Jim Crow segregation, the
prospect of a more participatory localism seemed less alarming. Racial

203. Lincoln County Letter, UNION REPUBLICAN (Winston-Salem, N.C.), July 26, 1894, at 1.
204. EDMONDS, supranote 196, at 118-19.
205. Relief for the East and the West, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 1898, at 7.
206. Id. at 121. This campaign was not only political-the white supremacist rhetoric was
responsible for violence across the state, most notably in Wilmington, where it fueled the
infamous and deadly race riots of 1898.
207. A set of talking points issued by the State Democratic Committee in response to the
populist campaign handbook makes the texture of the rhetoric clear. Over and over again, the
Committee argues that Republicans explicitly favor "Negro Rule" and that the populists have
been complicit partners in bringing this about. The Committee retells the history of the township
reforms of 1868 and the "heroic" fight against it culminating in the 1875 amendments. Against
this backdrop the core point is clear:
In the short time since the Republicans again came into power, wonderful progress
has been made in fixing the well known Republican policy of giving the local offices to
the negroes in the counties and towns of the east. . . .And again as in the days prior to
'76 [sic] the eastern people are appealing to their brethren of other sections for relief.
Populist Hand Book Answered, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Oct. 13, 1898, at 1.
208. True to Their Promises . . CHATHAM REC. (Pittsboro, N.C.), Apr. 20, 1899, at 2.

466

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2:413

resentment eased where there was no risk of integration, and outsider
resentment eased where the local governments looked and felt "home
grown." Over the next century, the idea that county officials would be
elected became normalized, and the restrictions on the targeted
counties were relaxed. Townships have disappeared into the
background of North Carolina local government law. 2 0 9 What remain
are counties, modified with elements of communitarian localism, but
still anchored to a proprietary past.
2. The Township Experiments in Virginia and South Carolina
North Carolina's township experiment was the most complex
and long-lasting in the post-bellum South. It was not, however, the
only one of its kind. In the two other states where the experiment was
tried, familiar battles between communitarian and proprietary
localism were staged. 210

209. Under current law, townships may be created, destroyed, or altered by authority of the
county government. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 153A-19 (West 2016). North Carolina courts
have consistently held that townships do not have any constitutional standing as local
governments: "[Tjhey are but territorial sections of counties upon which, for appropriate
purposes, power is conferred to perform functions of government of local application and
interest." Wittkowsky v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson Cty., 63 S.E. 275, 277 (N.C. 1908). That does
not mean that they are meaningless, as counties have on occasion vested townships with limited
grants of power. See Arnold v. Varnum, 237 S.E.2d 272, 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that
counties may grant townships the authority to operate public hospitals and levy taxes for that
purpose).

210. There was one other nearly contemporaneous township experiment that I am only
noting in passing here. In 1861, West Virginia broke away from Virginia and chose to remain in
the union. OTIS RICE, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY 140-41 (1985). At the new state's constitutional

convention in the fall of 1861, the delegates voted to enact Jefferson's long desired ward system
under a different name: the township system. See W. VA. CONST. of 1863 art. VII. The township
experiment lasted for a decade in West Virginia before it succumbed to the same forces at work
across the rest of the South. Although West Virginia was never conquered or subject to
Reconstruction government, it was among the first states to vote the Republicans out of office in
the first years of Redemption. See JOSEPH RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 8 (2006). The conservative agenda was

consistent with the agenda in other southern states: remove the yoke of Yankee rule and return
power to the native white elites. In this vein the townships were framed as an alien imposition.
At the same time, the old county court system, which had been demonized for a century by West
Virginians, emerged as a symbol of self-determination. See Samuel Woods, The New Constitution
Reviewed, SPIRIT JEFFERSON (Charlestown, W. Va.), Jul. 16, 1872, at 1. In 1872, the conservative
narrative triumphed, and the Democrats pushed through a new constitution that abandoned the
township experiment. In the words of dismayed Republicans observing from out of state, West
Virginia had given up "the most vital democratic feature than can be engrafted into any state
constitution" in favor of a system "under which the popular voice is relieved from nearly all the
duties of self-government." "The people of West Virginia propose to...," DAILY STATE J.
(Alexandria, Va.), Dec. 9, 1872, at 2.
In many ways, the story of the township experiment in West Virginia was a prequel to the
stories in North Carolina, Virginia, and South Carolina. A strong skepticism toward New
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a. Virginia
While racial resentment did not emerge until later in the
process in North Carolina, it was front and center from the beginning
in Virginia. There, the township experiment was met with immediate
white supremacist backlash when it was adopted in 1868, and it was
undermined before it could even take root when conservatives
regained control of the state in 1870.
Virginia's Reconstruction constitution (not ratified until 1870)
outlined the township experiment in Section 2 of Article VII-laying
out the new plan in a single paragraph. The key elements of the plan
were: (1) each county would be divided into not fewer than three
townships; (2) the officers would be elected annually, and they would
include: a supervisor, a clerk, an assessor, a collector, a commissioner
of roads, an overseer of the poor, three justices of the peace, and three
constables; (3) the supervisors of each township would comprise a
"board of supervisors" for the county as a whole, resolving issues of
county governance and disputes between townships. 2 11 This plan
looked quite different from the North Carolina plan on a number of
levels. 212 The most significant difference, it would turn out, was that
Virginia's plan was not self-executing-the legislature had to take
positive action to implement the townships.
As soon as the township experiment was proposed,
conservative papers noted with horror the prospect of some townships
where whites would be under the control of "[a] negro sheriff, a negro
attorney for the commonwealth, a negro county treasurer, a negro
superintendent of the poor, negro supervisors, negro assessors, negro
collectors, negro school trustees, negro constables, negro township
clerks, negro overseers of the roads, negro magistrates." 213 To bring
the point home, one paper went on to list the proportional white and
black population of a number of the state's counties to show just how
England imports and an "Old South" political establishment dedicated to returning to and
protecting the "old ways" won out in the mid-70s. The story was different, however, in that
neither race nor conquest were directly part of the story. Familiar though the rhetoric was, the
internal politics of West Virginia made the township experiment there seem more like a
continuation of the long fight over Jefferson's wards than a new form of local government for a
new South.
211. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VII, §2.
212. In the first place, the North Carolina plan took up thirteen sections of the new Article
VII, while this plan was just a single paragraph. More substantively, however, the Virginia plan
provided for many more township officers while also making the county's leading officers (the
Board of Supervisors) composed of the supervisors of the townships. This meant more officers
elected at the township level with more control over county government.
213. Address of the Conservative Members of the Late State Convention to the People of
Virginia, PETERSBURG INDEX, Apr. 21, 1868, at 1.
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great the risk of black domination was in a given county.2 14 Another
commenter observed with disgust that under the new system, "[tihe
negroes would have about two thirds of these [township] officers." 215
This appeal to racial anxiety was coupled with the fact that
Virginia did not have as robust a Republican majority as either of the
Carolinas. This was partly true because the most reliably Republican
western regions of the state had already departed to form West
Virginia. The relatively moderate group of Republicans that remained
fractured in 1870, leaving radicals on the outside of the governing
coalition. 2 16 Because the township system required legislative
enactment to take effect, the loss of the legislature was a crippling
blow.
By 1872, it was clear that it was only a matter of time before
the township provision was written out of the constitution altogether.
For a brief moment (and for the first time) in the face of this fatalistic
realization, the Republican establishment put up a defense. Edward
Daniels, a carpetbagger and Union veteran, was the editor of the State
Journalin Alexandria, one of the main organs of the Republican party
in the state. Between 1872 and 1874, he embarked on a spirited
defense of the township, framing it as the best hope for participatory
self-governance and the only engine of southern progress. 217 Daniels
was influential enough to get the party to write a township plank into
its 1873 platform calling for: "The perfection and enlargement of the
Township System so as to encourage emigration and co-operative

214. Id.
215. "You Mean Hound,"NATIVE VIRGINIAN (Orange, Va.), May 29, 1868, at 2.
216. Precipitated by a fight over the disfranchisement of former Confederate officers, the
state Republican Party split between radicals and a more moderate allegiance between
conservative Republicans and Democrats which called itself the "True Republicans." See JANE
ELIZABETH DAILEY, BEFORE JIM CROW: THE POLITICS OF RACE IN POSTEMANCIPATION VIRGINIA

27 (2000).
217. Take two articles, for example. In the first, Daniels muses on the best way to achieve
lasting political reform and takes Jefferson as a teacher. He attributes the quote "True political
reform must begin in the township" to Jefferson and goes on to argue that Jefferson was
concerned with Virginia's centralized political structure and that, despite the township system
existing in name, centralization still prevails. See Political Reform-Where to Begin It, DAILY
STATE J. (Alexandria, Va.), July 9, 1873, at 2. A week later Daniels returns to the theme, with a
more utopian rhetoric. The township is the "measure of true civilization." It is a school for
practical government and a school for living together: "Without the township there is no
healthful source for the political life of the nation. The state is a political cripple that has not its
strongest vitality in its townships." The problem is that the people have not committed
themselves to the project of learning at this school. The system must be more than a managerial
division, it must live in the "hearts of the people." They must "guard it as the very Ark of the
Covenant of Liberty." Only by establishing a committed and functioning township system can the
"great work of reconstruction" be done. The Township., DAILY STATE J. (Alexandria, Va.), July
22, 1873, at 2.
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colonies, thus increasing the power of local self-government against
state centralization." 218
As had happened in North Carolina, Republican commitment
to the township experiment solidified under attack, but there was
simply not enough support to save it. Conservative papers barely
bothered to defend the movement to abolish the system, and in 1874,
amendments to erase townships altogether were approved handily. 2 19
The amendments struck out the first two sections of Article VII,
thereby excising townships and all vestiges thereof from the
constitution as if they had never existed. 220
Virginia's return to the county court system was much more
thorough than North Carolina's. The townships were gone altogether,
and the old planter elites were free to reestablish control over local
government. Where appeals to participatory democracy and
communitarian localism had swayed some North Carolina voters,
Virginia (without West Virginia) was a tougher audience. The politics
of racial resentment were closer to the surface, and the old
commitment to elite planter control was deeply ingrained. In this
sense, Virginia's brief township experiment helps to explain the
absence of any township experiment at all in other southern states.
The same problem of local governance pertained across the South
after emancipation, but by and large, the answer was a return to
proprietary localism in the form of county government rather than
communitarian reform.
b. South Carolina
If racial resentment was front and center in Virginia, it was
nearly nonexistent in South Carolina. There (unlike Virginia and
North Carolina), the post-war electorate was majority-black. Just as it
did in the other states, the township experiment threatened to
redistribute power from those who held it to those without. But in
South Carolina, that meant that it threatened to give conservatives
more power than they would have otherwise had at the local level.
Before it was even a year old, it was killed by black elite politicians in
an effort to preserve their fragile control over state politics.

218. Proposed Platform, DAILY STATE J. (Alexandria, Va.), July 30, 1873, at 2.
219. The official tally of votes was 88,596 votes for the amendments to 60,066 votes against
them. By the Governor. A Proclamation, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 1874, at 2. Thus, the
amendments were approved by a roughly sixty percent majority. Despite the margin, the fact
that forty percent of the electorate voted to retain the townships is a helpful reminder that postReconstruction southern politics were not as monolithic as they seem.

220. Id.
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South Carolina's township experiment was the brainchild of a
single Yankee radical. David Corbin was a native Vermonter who was
raised in a small town on Lake Champlain. 22 1 After serving in the
Union army, in 1865 Corbin was ordered south to Charleston, South
Carolina, to work for the Freedmen's Bureau there. 222 In 1867, on the
eve of the new state constitutional convention, Corbin was appointed
U.S. Attorney for South Carolina (a position he would hold for the next
ten years, simultaneously with many others). 223 Corbin was not an
active member of the constitutional convention of 1868, but he had
been elected to serve in the state senate during the special legislative
session held with the express purpose of drafting legislation to flesh
out the new legal regime. 224 It was there that he made his mark on the
post-war legal structure of his adopted state. 225
In 1868, Corbin drafted and defended an elaborate bill to divide
South Carolina's counties into townships. 226 Corbin's law read as if he
had simply transplanted the Vermont model he was familiar with in
all of its intricate procedural detail into South Carolina. 227 Perhaps

221. Linda M. Welch, David T. Corbin, VT. CIVIL WAR, http://vermontcivilwar.org/get.php
?input=1430 (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P656-2VPJ].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224.

Although the laws enacted at this special session were not part of the constitution, they

were quasi-constitutional in the sense that they were explicitly intended to elaborate on the new
constitution and lay out the legal framework for the new state. In fact, these laws were printed
for publication alongside the constitution itself. See THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
ADOPTED APRIL 16, 1868, AND THE ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
PASSED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF 1868, TOGETHER WITH THE MILITARY ORDERS THEREIN RE-

ENACTED (Columbia, S.C., John W. Denny 1868).
225. Corbin and Tourgbe were parallel figures in many ways. Like Tourgbe, Corbin
introduced bills to reform all parts of South Carolina's legal system, from the courts to the legal
code to the prisons. See Columbia, July 8, ORANGEBURG NEWS, July 11, 1868, at 2 (introducing a
judicial elections bill); Special Telegraph to the Daily News, CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 12,
1868, at 1 (introducing a penitentiary reform bill).
226. Prior to 1868, South Carolina had no counties. Instead, the state was divided up into
"districts." The new constitution transformed those districts into counties and made county
offices elected rather than appointed. See Gaud v. Walker, 53 S.E.2d 316, 321 (S.C. 1962).
227. The system was actually embedded in a pair of statutes. The first law defined the
"Jurisdiction and Duties of County Commissioners." An Act to Define the Jurisdiction and Duties
of County Commissioners, Pub. L. No. 66, 1868 S.C. Acts 128. Those commissioners' first
responsibility, upon passage of the act was to "divide their respective Counties into townships."
Id. § 11, 1868 S.C. Acts at 130. The extent of these townships was outlined with painstaking
specificity. They could be anywhere between thirty-six and one hundred square miles (depending
on population, infrastructure, and convenience). When surveyors laid out the borders, they were
required to

erect permanent monuments to designate the respective boundary lines at every angle
thereof . . . The monuments shall be of stone, brick or iron, and be at least four feet
high from the surface of the ground, and the initial letter of the respective names of
contiguous townships shall be plainly and legibly cut or marked thereon.

2017]

RECONSTRUCTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

471

because of its bewildering complexity and specificity, at first almost
nothing was done by anyone at the state or county level to implement
Corbin's plan. 22 8 In the first half of 1869, some momentum picked up.
A few townships were laid out and named, and some elections were
held. These few elections revealed a troubling trend for the governing
Republicans: across the state reports began to come in that black
voters, even in majority-black townships, were rejecting party-line
politics and electing mixed tickets of white and black township
officers. 229 Before the township elections, counties had been firmly
under the control of Republican officers, many of them black. Now
conservatives and white supremacists were using local government as
a tool to begin to break up black political power in the state. 230
To make matters worse, the township statutes were so complex
that officers across racial and political lines were having a hard time
figuring out how to make it work: it was "a sore puzzle to many." 2 3 1 At
the confluence of these problems, a movement began in the summer of
1869 to abolish the township system. Mutterings started to come from
across the state. Grand juries recommended repeal in their old
capacity as assessors of the public welfare. 232 Newspapers began to
Id. The second statute (Pub. L. No. 71, §§ 6-65) laid out the township procedures in agonizing
detail. An Act to Organize Townships, and to Define Their Powers and Privileges, Pub. L. No. 71
§§ 6-65, 1868 S.C. Acts 146, 146-53. There were to be annual meetings (set for the "second
Tuesday of April") where the town residents would meet to choose a Town Clerk, three town
selectmen, at least one surveyor of the highways, and one constable. Id. The procedures for these
meetings were laid out in a detail that seemed to be drawn from extensive practical experience.
The most prominent import from Vermont was the office of "moderator." Moderators were (and
remain) the people who preside over the meeting. They are the parliamentarians, chairpeople,
and facilitators. Corbin's plan followed the old New England model whereby a different
moderator would be chosen at each meeting. See id.
228. Corbin was outraged, arguing that the township system was the linchpin of local
governance for the whole state. He managed to push some counties to act, but it was slow going.
See Affairs in Columbia, CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 4, 1868, at 1.
229. See Affairs in Colleton. An Interesting Letter from the Country, CHARLESTON DAILY

NEWS, June 30, 1869, at 1. This concern echoed Tourgbe's concerns after the first local elections
in North Carolina in 1869. One of the elements of more local government meant that old
dynamics of oppression, dependence, and violence could be brought to bear on the political
process more directly. The result was that in places black voters were being coerced through
force or persuasion to cede power to the old elites.
230. It is easy to overstate this point, and the precise level of discontent among the black
political leadership is almost impossible to gauge. What is clear, however, is that conservative
observers were apt to gloat about the fact that the township law was not working out to the
advantage of the radicals-which explained why they turned against it. See Things in
Darlington, CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1869, at 1.

231. Meeting of Selectmen, INTELLIGENCER (Anderson, S.C.), May 13, 1869.
232. The grand juries got more and more pointed as the prospect of repeal became more
imminent. In July, a grand jury disapproved of the way that the system handled road repair and
called for either reform or, if necessary, repeal. See Presentment of the Grand Jury, KEOWEE
COURIER (Pickens, S.C.), July 23, 1869, at 2. By October, a different grand jury went further,
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call for repeal. 233 But the most significant event was that a statewide
organization of county commissioners-a largely radical (and black)
body of politicians-emerged as opponents of the system. The
commissioners met for the first time in July, "for the purpose of taking
into consideration the present township law with its great burden."
They drafted an official memorial requesting that the law be repealed
or suspended. 234
The township system was left almost without support. In the
last months of 1869, the Republican-dominated legislature proposed a
bill to repeal the township system to almost no opposition. 235 Despite
Corbin's last-ditch appeal to the virtues of participatory selfgovernment, 236 the coalition in opposition was just too strong. In
January of 1870, the bill was repealed, and South Carolina's
townships vanished. 237 Only four senators voted against repeal. 238
It is impossible to say how a more modest township plan on the
model of either North Carolina or Virginia would have fared in South
Carolina. It is certainly true that the bewildering detail of Corbin's
plan emphasized the degree to which the new system was an

arguing that while the system might work in New England, it does not work in poor, sparsely
populated South Carolina. See G.W. Fox, Presentment of the Grand Jury, INTELLIGENCER
(Anderson, S.C.), Oct. 7, 1869, at 2. A third grand jury in Lancaster County agreed in November,
arguing that the system does not work here and "beg[ging] [for] a repeal of the act creating the
townships, or a suspension of the same for a term of ten years." The Township System,
EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER, Nov. 3, 1869, at 3.

233. The Daily Phoenix in Columbia echoed the sentiments of the Marion Star that
repealing the township law would be a "step in the right direction." Weekly Review of the State
Press, DAILY PHOENIX (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 15, 1869, at 2.
234. Meeting of County Commissioners, DAILY PHOENIX (Columbia, S.C.), July 30, 1869, at 2.
235. See From the State Capital, CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 25, 1869, at 1.
Conservatives were thrilled at this outcome invoking outsider resentment to crow over the

demise of a plan to "turn South Carolina into a new Ireland, making every township a feof, ruled
by the officers of the conquering power." Id.
236. Corbin argued in his final protest that townships were the bastions of empowered local
self-governance. When governance is

in the hands of the people . . . [the] public interest are excited, the people educated,
and the country developed and improved. .. . [With the repeal of this act] the people
are deprived, at one fell swoop, of any voice in their local affairs. . . . We protest
against this enormity.

The Last Sensation. Metropolitan Police Tyranny. A Protest Against Repealing the Township
Law, CHARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1870, at 1.

237. The repeal left one fragment of the law in place: "[Tihat portion ... fixing the number,
names and boundaries of the respective townships in the respective Counties." Acts and Joint
Resolutions Passed by the Legislature of South Carolina. An Act to Repeal and Act Entitled "An
Act to Organize Townships and to Define Their Powers and Privileges," DAILY PHOENIX
(Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 27, 1870, at 2. Although this suggests that the shadow of the township
system still remained on the maps and in the administrative structure of the state, the
townships fell out of use and are no longer part of the state's municipal scheme.
238. Repeal of the Township Act, ORANGEBURG NEWS, Jan. 22, 1870, at 2.
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imposition rather than an organic system of self-government. The
South Carolina experience reveals something critical about structural
local reform. The township system, in isolation, was no protection of
racial equality. Rather, by forging new polities and framing new
definitions of local self-government, it promised to unsettle and
redistribute political power. Where that redistribution threatened
white elites and triggered racial anxiety (North Carolina and
Virginia), conservatives and white supremacists opposed it. But where
that redistribution threatened a nascent but strong base of black
political power, black Republicans and their allies opposed it.
3. Elsewhere in the South
What can these four stories really tell us about the broader
question of how localism and local government reform operated during
Reconstruction? One might reasonably argue that North Carolina's
story was an outlier-a product of some combination of coincidence,
personality, and North Carolina's unique politics. To some degree,
there is no doubt that this view is right. The township experiment was
not programmatic. Where it was implemented, it was the product of
individual Yankee idealists responding to the situation before them.
But it is precisely the idiosyncrasies of the separate experiments that
suggests that together they reveal something more consistent across
the region.
When Tourg6e et al. identified the problem of postemancipation local government and proposed to establish a new
communitarian localism in the South, they poked a hornet's nest.
Simply because that nest was not poked in other states did not mean
that it was not there. The racial and outsider resentments that fueled
opposition to the township wherever it was implemented were
common enough to support the inference that a similar dynamic would
likely have played out had the experiment been tried in Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, or elsewhere. In this sense, the
story of North Carolina's township experiment is not an outlier so
much as it is a window into the otherwise difficult to perceive
transition between plantation localism and Jim Crow localism.
This is consistent with what we can glean from local
government reforms in other southern states. In Georgia and Florida,
the 1868 constitutions began the process of turning over control of the
local governments to the state legislature immediately. 239 In Alabama,

239. In Georgia, the 1868 constitution preserved the old county court system with the slight
change that the state legislature was empowered (though not required) to establish the office of
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Mississippi, and Texas, on the other hand, county governments were
pushed toward a more participatory democratic model: county officers
(sheriffs, magistrates, solicitors, clerks) were made subject to election,
rather than appointment. 240 These were small steps, but they met
much the same fate as the township had when Redemption came in
the mid-1870s. The fear of "negro domination" led conservatives and
Democrats across the South to take steps to restrict black political
power at the local level. Raw violence and intimidation outside of the
constitutional process were a large part of the story.24 1 These steps
were bolstered by constitutional changes as well. The Texas
Constitution of 1876 did not end local elections, but it did follow North
Carolina and Dillon's Rule in asserting that local governments were
"legal subdivisions of the state" and assigning many of the functions
that they had previously performed to the state legislature. 242 In 1890,
Mississippi solved the problem of local black political power through
explicit provisions disenfranchising black voters. 243
The most extreme example of retreating to proprietary localism
from weak communitarianism (beyond the township experiment
states) is Alabama. In 1875, Alabama rewrote its constitution to give
state government the same kind of control over local government that
North Carolina asserted. Where blacks and Republicans wielded local
power, the state legislature abolished the local governments and took
it upon themselves to appoint the local officials themselves. 244 In 1901,
county commissioner "in such counties as may require them, and to define their duties." GA.
CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 15. In Florida, the constitutional language was stronger, and gave the
legislature power to make sweeping changes to the system of local government. FL. CONST. of
1868, art. IV, § 21 ("The Legislature shall establish a uniform system of county, township, and
municipal government.").

240. See ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 21; id. art. VI,
art. V, § 21; TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, §§ 9, 18, 19.
241.

§§

11, 17, 18; MIss. CONST. of 1868,

See SARAH WOOLFOLK WIGGINS, THE SCALAWAG IN ALABAMA POLITICS, 1865-1881, at

118 (1977) ("Although the Ku Klux Klan no longer officially existed in Alabama, a reign of terror
against Republicans continued, especially in west Alabama counties with a heavy black
population."). In Mississippi, the efforts to suppress black democratic participation at the local
level were even more pronounced. White supremacists devised the "Mississippi Plan" to
systematically intimidate and disenfranchise black voters in the 1875 elections. MICHAEL LES
BENEDICT, THE FRUITS OF VICTORY: ALTERNATIVES TO RESTORING THE UNION, 1865-1877, at 143

(1986).
242. See TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. XI, §§ 1-2 (noting the individual legal status of counties).
243. Mississippi was the first among many southern states to adopt explicit
disenfranchisement measures into its constitution. "The Mississippi Constitution of 1890
disqualified those convicted of certain crimes, and required voters to pay a poll tax, pass a
literacy test and be able to read, understand and interpret the state constitution." Gabriel J.
Chin, The "Voting Rights Act of 1867"- The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Suffrage
DuringReconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1592 (2004).
244. See Will Parker, Still Afraid of "Negro Domination?"` Why County Home Rule
Limitations in the Alabama Constitution of 1901 are Unconstitutional, 57 ALA. L. REV. 545, 557
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the new constitution took matters further, cementing absolute state
control over local government and hamstringing local governments
from providing even the most basic services. 245 In Alabama, even
absent the challenge of a truly communitarian localism, the resolution
during the peak of Jim Crow was a retreat to strict proprietary
localism that protected property and prevented local governments
from threatening the status quo distribution of power. 246
Although what I have provided here is little more than a sketch
of broader trends in post-bellum southern localism, the sketch is clear
enough to show the value that attention to the township experiments
has. It is through the contrast between the communitarian localism of
the township and the proprietary opposition to it that the dynamics at
work across the South become clear. The Jim Crow local settlement in
North Carolina was not an outlier-it was the rule.
C. History Lessons
The demise of all three of the township experiments, seen from
a distance, fits well into the standard historical narrative of
Reconstruction. Historians of Reconstruction from DuBois to Dunning
to Foner have all essentially agreed that southern resistance to
Reconstruction was fueled by a cocktail of white supremacy, outsider
resentment, and antebellum nostalgia. If this story is familiar, the
failure of the township seems inevitable: the townships were defeated
in North Carolina and elsewhere because they were intended to

(2005) ("During the late 1870s, the legislature abolished at least nine courts of county
commissioners or city councils in the Black Belt."). Judge Myron Thompson described it
succinctly in his opinion in a 1986 case:
Following this "redemption" by the white-supremacist Democratic party, the state
legislature passed a series of local laws that eliminated elections for county
commission and instead gave the governor the power to appoint the commissioners.
This system of gubernatorial appointment was particularly favored in black belt
counties threatened with black voting majorities. According to the plaintiffs' historian,
the gubernatorial appointment system is widely understood to have been designed to
prevent the election of black county commissioners.
Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1986), order dissolved,
CIV.A.2:85CV1332-MHT, 2006 WL 3392071 (M.D. Ala. July 31, 2006), and order dissolved,
CIV.A. 2:85CV1332MHT, 2006 WL 3923887 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 3, 2006).
245. See Parker, supra note 244, at 549-52 (explaining several provisions of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901).
246. See Joe

Summers, Missing Local Democracy, in A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY:

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN ALABAMA 67 (Bailey Thompson ed., 2002) ("The clear intent of the
framers of the 1901 Alabama Constitution was to stifle democracy in the state. These men,
mainly wealthy plantation owners and Birmingham industrialists, sought to protect their
property and privilege from populist demands for responsive government.").
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undermine white supremacy, Yankeeize the South, and kill the old
aristocracy.
While this history certainly fits into the familiar standard
narrative, it would be too easy to file the demise of the township
experiment as just another inevitable failure. 247 My reading of the
township experiments suggests that while their demise was consistent
with the tide of southern politics, it was not as inevitable as it might
seem today. Consider, again, the real-world local government crisis
facing every southern state and county after emancipation. In a place
like Granville County, plantation localism rooted in a weak county
court was no longer possible or adequate. Something new was needed.
Where Yankee reformers had the idea and the political support, they
proposed what seemed to them to be the best and only solution to a
vacuum of local government: the communitarian town. It was the best
and only hope for building a new healthy government on the ashes of
the conquered Confederacy.
No one disagreed that the old order was either dead or
seriously wounded. Southern conservatives grudgingly acknowledged
that the slaves had been freed and that black men were now legally
allowed to vote (though they undermined this freedom with every
stratagem at their command for more than a century-and even into
the present), and they grudgingly accepted that they had lost the war.
They were acutely aware that they had been conquered and were
being ruled by a combination of the conquering force and their former
slaves. What resulted was a struggle at all levels of government
between two new orders. The Yankees proposed a renovation, and the
township experiment was a perfect example of the sort of total change
that such a renovation meant. Conservatives, on the other hand,
proposed a new set of protections for elite power, which they sold as a
return to the old order, but that, in fact, was a new view of
government and localism. The North Carolina story reveals the extent
to which two somewhat contrasting strands of arguments intersected.
Local government was centralized and controlled by the only branch of
government that the elites trusted. At the same time, all levels of
government were directed away from providing services and
redistributing power and wealth and were directed toward a
247. That the failure of Reconstruction was inevitable has been one of the most consistent
and difficult to shake themes in the last century of Reconstruction historiography. It is hard to
argue with Jane Dailey when she says that "historians have traditionally taken the victory of
Democratic race baiting for granted and have seen white racial animosity and anxiety as
inevitable . . . ." DAILEY, supra note 216, at 78. Nevertheless, there is a consistent, if consistently
minor, strain of scholarship that has questioned the inevitability of the end of Reconstruction
and the onset of Jim Crow. See id. at 6 (noting various scholarly approaches).
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protectionist proprietary stance of protecting self-determination
against the dangers of racial and outsider control.
We know how it turned out across the South, but there was a
real struggle between these two new visions. As was most clear in
North Carolina, the township really did represent a powerful tool of
political change. Those who had been shut out of power before (blacks,
poor whites, yeoman farmers) were suddenly voting in local elections
and getting elected. The township was supposed to leverage these
changes slowly by changing the terms of local politics until the new
polity was self-supporting. But it was precisely these changed terms
that motivated southern conservative opposition. Conservatives
demanded "relief for the East" not only because of their immediate
outrage at being governed by their former slaves, but because of the
threat that the new polity posed to the old regime as a whole. 2 4 8 In
short, the townships began to do the very transformative work that
they had promised, and so they needed to be stopped.
Recognizing the potential of the township experiments doubles
back on a common theme in Reconstruction history. Could it be true
that the township experiments, for all their flaws, might have been
effective policy? It has become commonplace to imagine what would
have happened had the radicals actually achieved agrarian reform
(forty acres and a mule) and redistributed southern land. Why not also
imagine what might have happened had the township system taken
hold? One could conceive of any number of ways in which a robust
system of local governance might have mitigated Jim Crow, even
without wholly buying into the utopian rhetoric of the system's
Yankee boosters. 249
There is one final point to make within the framework of
Reconstruction historiography. Looking from the local upwards
suggests that there may be local roots to the region-wide ideology of
Redemption and Jim Crow. The ways in which racial resentment and
outsider resentment shaped the desire for proprietary localism and
the rejection of communitarian localism help to explain the larger
trend toward government retreat during the last decades of the
nineteenth century in the South. The redemption governments
adopted wide-ranging policies of "retrenchment" calling for radically
shrinking government and taxation. As C. Vann Woodward observed,
"Cheapness, even niggardliness, under this tutelage became widely
248. See Relieffor the East and the West, supra note 205.
249. This hypothetical has its most famous adherent in Tourg6e himself, who proposed in
his novel Bricks Without Straw that had the township system survived in North Carolina, it
would have served as a bulwark against white supremacy, ignorance, and the oncoming shadow
of Jim Crow.
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.. Large numbers of

offices were abolished, departments were cut to skeleton staffs, and
occasionally public services were simply dropped." 250 The extreme
austerity extended to all areas of government but especially to those
identified as holdovers from Yankee rule. Public schools were a
particular target, and budgets for schools across the South were
slashed. 251 In Florida, the legislature abolished the newly established
penitentiary and stopped work on the state's first public university. 252
The result of retrenchment was a radically minimalist model of
government that privileged the power of property holders and serviced
a libertarian laissez-faire model of economics. 253
The most common explanations for the redeemers' embrace of
retrenchment are economic and racial. Some historians (both
sympathetic and critical) have argued that after the federal
government withdrew from the South, there simply was not enough
money to support all of the social services that the Republicans had
erected. 254 Poverty was the result of conquest both because of the
ravages of the war (and the end of slavery) and because of the
perceived corruption of the Reconstruction governments. 255 If conquest
explained scarcity, it also explained southern resentment.
Conservatives believed that the Yankee innovations were intended to
benefit the freed blacks, and thus saw taxes as mandated
redistribution. The way to ensure not only that black citizens would be
excluded from public office, but that they would be excluded from
public services as well, was simply to abandon government as much as
possible. 256
These accounts of retrenchment have not always been central
to the story of the birth of Jim Crow during Redemption. The story of
the township experiment suggests, first, that they should be more

250. WOODWARD, supra note 198, at 59.
251. See id. at 60-63 ("[T]hroughout the South public education suffered under the pinch of
the Redeemers' policy of retrenchment as well as under the general poverty and depression."); see
also FONER, supra note 68, at 589 (noting that Texas began charging fees for its schools, while
Mississippi and Alabama placed the entire tax burden for schools on local governments).
252. See FONER, supra note 68, at 589 (noting Florida's "retrenchment" policy).
253. J. MICHAEL MARTINEZ, COMING FOR TO CARRY ME HOME: RACE IN AMERICA FROM
ABOLITIONISM TO JIM CROW 217 (2011).

254. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 198, at 60-61 (arguing that "the extreme poverty of
the South would have made a satisfactory program of public education and services impossible
under any regime").

255. MARTINEZ, supra note 253, at 217.
256. FONER, supra note 68, at 588 (arguing that the Redeemers were unified by a desire to
"dismantl[e] the Reconstruction state, reduc[e] the political power of blacks, and reshap[e] the
South's legal system in the interests of labor control and racial subordination").
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central. Understanding the way that racial and outsider resentment
operated at the local level helps explain how the post-bellum South
shaped its "way of life." The retreat from services at the state and
regional level was perfectly consistent with the retreat from
communitarian localism and the embrace of proprietary localism.
Moreover, to the extent that the government was active during
Redemption and Jim Crow, it acted to preserve the social orderthrough laws mandating segregation and through proprietary
protections of property holders in a shadow version of plantation
localism.
D. Coda: Jim Crow Localism
Jim Crow localism was, to a large degree, the return to
plantation localism that the opponents of the township experiments
sought. As a descriptive matter, weak county governments (often
democratically unaccountable) served to protect the freedom of elite
property owners to assert wide-ranging control over southern political,
economic, and social life. There is a puzzle in this parallel, however:
the Jim Crow era is usually remembered as an era of robust
government intervention in the lives of southern citizens. The figure
for this intervention was "de jure" segregation where state and local
government mandated and enforced a regime of racialized apartheid.
It is indisputable that white supremacy was inscribed in law and
enforced by government during the period between Redemption and
the mid-twentieth century. So too is it indisputable that racial
inequality continues to exist long after the Jim Crow legal regime was
dismantled. It has been tempting, therefore, for scholars to draw a
distinction between the "clear" government sponsored racism of the
old days and the "covert" de facto racism that pervades our
institutions today. 2 57 Leaving the complexities of this caricature to one
side for the moment, this useful binary tends to suggest that Jim Crow
was an era of strong state regulation.
And indeed it was, but this government-enforced white
supremacy does not undermine the observation that local government
257. The distinction between de jure and de facto racism can be found everywhere-from
middle school textbooks to academic history books. One particularly influential account
manifest in institutional
distinguishes Jim Crow-where racism was an "ideology ...
arrangements, such as separate schools and voting restrictions"-from "laissez-faire racism"where "modern racial inequality relies on the market and informal racial bias to re-create, and in
some instances sharply worsen, structured racial inequality." Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel
& Ryan A. Smith, Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack
&

Ideology, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 15, 17 (Steven A. Tuch

Jack K. Martin eds., 1997).
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was weak and as proprietary as possible. That is because the
regulatory regime of segregation worked hand in glove with a return
to elite control over local life. The Jim Crow laws were parallel to
slavery itself-a set of tools to maintain the social and racial hierarchy
that private control required. The problem of Reconstruction for
conservatives and white supremacists was, what should be done about
emancipation and the "problem" of newly minted black citizens? In
order to approximate a return to the old "southern way of life" rooted
in plantation localism, the old racial hierarchy needed to be
reestablished. Replacing slavery with a system of laws that
reinscribed white supremacy achieved this goal, and so, just as
southern states enforced slavery, they enforced the Jim Crow laws,
leaving room for elite whites to reestablish control over the details of
local governance.
Remember that the Jim Crow order began with retrenchment
and a radical reduction of government services. As the tide of
government services receded, those left behind were those who had
most benefitted from those services: the freed men and women. The
initial result at the end of the nineteenth century was a set of laws
establishing state-sponsored segregation that facilitated a dramatic
increase in the power of the money and property-rich elite to dictate
the terms of daily life. 2 5 8

A clear way to see this result is to observe the daily dynamics
of local governance of black citizens in the Jim Crow South. Two of the
most salient outrages, sharecropping and lynching, were both
approximations of the plenary power held by planters under
plantation localism that were insulated from interference by the Jim
Crow state.
Sharecropping was the dominant agricultural arrangement in
the post-Reconstruction South. Black farmers were given contracts to
work small "farms" with their families. Workers subsisted on the land,
trading their labor and their crops for necessities in a nearly constant
state of debt. 259 This system was sanctioned by law, but that law was
essentially an abdication of government regulation. The agricultural
system was structured by lien laws that gave planters control over the

258. Risa Goluboff has recently argued that the public and private faces of Jim Crow were
intertwined and that it was as much an economic system as it was a government system. "Jim
Crow existed because every day, in ways momentous and quotidian, governments, private
institutions, and millions of individuals made decisions about hiring, firing, consuming,
recreating, governing, educating, and serving that kept blacks out, down, and under." RISA L.
GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 7 (2007).

259. See FONER, supra note 68, at 594 (explaining the southern property laws of the late
1800s and the concept of "sharecropping").
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crops grown on their land. Laborers were explicitly denied the
protected status of landowner and were instead given limited rights to
farm the land without owning the products of their work. 260
The landowner's dominance of the local economic sphere was so
complete that in many cases, sharecroppers were paid only in
dedicated scrip that could only be redeemed at the planter-owned
"company store." 2 6 1 In many ways, sharecropping reinscribed all of the
old economic local control of the old plantation system, but outside of
the boundaries of government. 26 2
If sharecropping represented privatized economic localism,
then lynching represented privatized police power. Lynch law was the
opposite of governmental policing. Jim Crow lynch law was
characterized by the government's agents (the police) staying out of
the way of private vigilantes. 263 While the official corridors of
governmental justice were not bastions of racial equality in the Jim
Crow South, 264 vigilantism and lynchings were among the most
important exercises of local police power. 265 The threat of violence,
coupled with the knowledge that the government would do nothing to
stop it, was functionally a form of police power. Much like the
impunity of the master in his dealings with his slaves, lynch law
subjected black citizens to a privatized system of local control.

260. See id. (same).
261. See MARTINEZ, supra note 253, at 164 ("Sharecroppers often were forced to purchase
shoddy merchandise and foodstuffs from company stores at exorbitant prices.").
262. Foner and others note that sharecropping did provide more day to day autonomy than
existed in the plantation. See FONER, supra note 68, at 595 (stating that "blacks clung to
whatever day-to-day autonomy they could wrest from the sharecropping system"). This is
undoubtedly true on its own terms, although the fact that many sharecroppers had no currency

and were contractually bound to the land limited the degree to which they could exercise any
autonomy.

263. For one statement of this among many, see Louis Lusky, Racial Discriminationand the
Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1174 (1963) (stating that
"[slince the police play no part except to stay away and let the lynchers do their work, it involves
little public expense, preparation, or manpower.").
264. Historians have reached a consensus that black citizens suffered a loss of legal rights
during the Jim Crow era. See Melissa Milewski, From Slave to Litigant: African Americans in
Court in the Postwar South, 1865-1920, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 723, 725-26 (2012) (collecting
sources). There is some evidence, however, that this consensus overstates the point by focusing
primarily on cases involving racially charged legal questions like segregation, interracial sexual
liaisons, and voting rights. See id. (collecting sources).
265. See David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in
Twentieth Century America, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 793, 822 (2005):
By "taking the law into their own hands," Southern lynch mobs transformed felt
weakness into a show of strength, claiming the sovereign power to manage their own
affairs, defeat their own enemies, and assure their own security. Lynchings asserted
the continuing autonomy of local communities and marked out the practical limits of
state and federal power.
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These two examples, by no means the only ones, paint the
picture of a Jim Crow localism where broad private power over poor
black residents was protected by government. Seen from the local
level, Jim Crow localism looks a great deal like plantation localism.
The promise of communitarian, participatory local power for black
residents was marginally brighter after Reconstruction, but the
overall governmental commitment to proprietary localism and
protection was much the same.
III. IMPLICATIONS: PRESENT EXAMPLES
Extrapolating present lessons from history is a risky
enterprise. Historians (legal or otherwise) are schooled to avoid the
temptations of "presentism." 266 It is undoubtedly true that drawing
concrete and discrete contemporary prescriptions from history
necessarily takes that history "out of context." Any simplistic attempt
to transpose a historical narrative from its past context into the
present will both produce bad prescriptions and flatten the history
itself.
Why then, one might reasonably ask, propose any present
implications from the history of the township experiment? Why not
quit while I am ahead? Here are three answers. First, as a theoretical
matter, I am sympathetic with the cadre of new critical legal
historians who argue that legal history is an essential tool for
interrogating the present. Markus Dubber argues that "the point of
historical analysis here is, once again, critique, and more specifically
critique of present conditions." 267 Christopher Tomlins and John
Comaroff agree, pushing against the "caesura that amputates past
from present" in history, preferring instead a critical history that
"interrogates, judges, and condemns the past in order to free the
present from its grasp." 2 6 8 This leads me to my second point. In

writing this history, I have not been able to avoid reflecting on the
266. To simplify greatly, presentism in the practice of history refers to the disfavored
tendency to read the events of the past "in terms of present concerns" rather than placing them
in their rich, and highly contingent context. "Presentism, at its worst, encourages a kind of moral
complacency and self-congratulation." See Lynn Hunt, Against Presentism, AM. HIST. Ass'N (May
2002), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2002/
against-presentism [https://perma.cclMC2K-VFYL].
267. Markus D. Dubber, New Historical Jurisprudence:Legal History as CriticalAnalysis of
Law, 2 CRITIcAL ANALYsIs L. 1, 8 (2015).
268. Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, "Law As..
Theory and Practice in Legal
History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2011). My own project is not nearly so intrepid as
either Dubber or Tomlins proposes. They, along with Holmes and Nietzsche, see history as a tool
for dismantling the false idols of the present. I propose, more modestly, that reflecting on history
can help us understand the present.
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ways in which present problems in local government law seem
genealogically connected to these past problems. The fights over local
government during Reconstruction are both fundamentally different
That
from today's fights and, simultaneously, reminiscent.
reminiscence bears reflection. Thirdly, and finally, in undertaking
that reflection, I am convinced that our present conversations about
local government law are enriched and altered, if not revolutionized,
by this history. Traces of communitarian and proprietary localism are
evident in present battles over local government from zoning, to
education, to municipal incorporation, to state takeovers. In the
specific context of Reconstruction, communitarian localists advocated
for the township and for local autonomy, while proprietary localists
fought against the township and advocated for state control over local
government. During Reconstruction, the theoretical arguments about
what local government is for were intertwined with concrete proposals
for how local government should be structured.
In present debates about local government and what it is good
for, echoes of communitarian and proprietary localism persist. Some
advocates still argue that local government should be a vehicle for
civic participation, robust public services, and an egalitarian polity.
Others argue that local government should protect private property,
maintain low taxes, and protect existing distributions of wealth and
power. The trouble in the present is that these arguments are not
nearly so clearly linked to specific local government structures as they
were during Reconstruction. Present communitarian localists
sometimes favor more local autonomy and sometimes favor less. The
same is true of present proprietary localists. Even messier is the fact
that parts of rhetoric of communitarian localism (especially regarding
self-governance) are often used to defend a vision of localism that
protects private property rather than encouraging civic participation.
The messiness of applying the historical lesson to the present is
a reminder of how careful we must be with the translation. These are
echoes and reflections, not iron-bound causal links. And yet, the
messiness should not obscure the extent to which the core terms of the
debates over localism are similar. The three examples that follow
reveal communitarian and proprietary localism as present positions
linked to history. The echoes of the history give us new purchase and
new perspective on the problems of local government law that we face
today.
As a pragmatic matter, new perspective promises better
debates, which, in turn, might promise better policy. Present day
proprietary localists still draw energy from racial resentment, outsider
resentment, and a desire to protect property from redistribution.
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Likewise, present day communitarian localists still too often imagine
that structural legal reforms can effect sweeping societal change.
Knowing the history and seeing the connections to the present lays
the groundwork for more nuanced and perhaps better thinking about
what local government is good for today.
At a broader level, recognizing battles over local government as
a competition between two conceptions of localism is a shift in the way
that we think about local government law. More often than not, the
debate amongst local government law scholars focuses on whether
localism is a force for good or a force for ill. Some scholars argue that
local governments can be vehicles for good and just government, 269
while others argue that local governments and local autonomy are
vehicles of exclusion, racial inequality, and injustice. 270 The history
here suggests new terms for this debate. The question is not whether
localism is good or bad-the question is what local government is good
for. 2 7 1 That is the question that was being asked during

269. Local government optimists are split into two camps. Gerald Frug is usually identified
with the position that local autonomy is necessary to achieve authentic civic participation and
self-governance. In truth, while autonomy is the word often used to label his position, Frug is not
a champion of autonomy in its familiar sense. He advocates, instead, for a "decentralized" form of
local autonomy where local power exists, but in a complex overlapping set of local structures,
rather than a single, unitary, sovereign municipal government. See generally Gerald E. Frug,

Decentering Decentralization,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1993). Drawing on Tocqueville and Arendt,
Frug suggests that local power enhances a citizen's "ability to participate actively in the basic
societal decisions that affect one's life." Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1068 (1980). While Frug and others in this camp argue that participatory governance
is "good governance," they do not argue that it is efficient. See id. at 1067. The argument that
local autonomy provides for efficient governance is instead linked to the public choice economic
analysis of Charles Tiebout, who argued that multiple empowered small municipalities would
allow for mobile "consumer-voters" to choose the local community that best fit their needs for
municipal services. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
270. Sheryll Cashin's formulation is representative: "Localism, or the ideological
commitment to local governance, has helped to produce fragmented metropolitan regions
stratified by race and income." Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter:Addressing the Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000).
271. This point is an admittedly abbreviated gesture at a larger intervention into the field
that I intend to pursue in future work. It is my view that the fight over whether localism is a
good thing has created an unnecessary stalemate in the literature. The problem begins with the
definition of localism. Note Cashin's framing in the quote in the previous note: localism is "the
ideological commitment to local governance." Id. Building from this definition, pessimists like
Richard Briffault argue that "our localism" offers license for local governments to segregate and
exacerbate inequalities. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 382. Briffault and Cashin see Frug's
optimistic embrace of local governance as romantic-imagining what local governments could do
rather than being realistic about what they are doing. Buried by this argument is the fact that
all parties actually share a common idea about what local government should be good for. All of
these interlocutors agree that good local government would be inclusive and participatory. The
disagreement is in outlook. Frug and the optimists think that good local government is possible
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Reconstruction, and, as the three examples that follow show, that is
the question that is still being asked today.
A. Rolling Hills-The ProprietarySuburb
Since the end of the nineteenth century, municipal
incorporation has been used as a tool for groups to escape from larger
governing polities (counties or cities). All too often, homeowners
seeking to escape a larger, more racially and economically diverse
polity managed to make use of the forms of government to facilitate
that escape. 272 A stark example of this model of retreat from
government is the "city" of Rolling Hills, on the Palos Verdes
Peninsula. Rolling Hills began in 1936 as a private housing
development on unincorporated land in Los Angeles County. 273 It was
a gated community, surrounded by a wall enclosing some of the most
valuable property in southern California. All of its roads were
privately maintained, and the community governed itself through a
community association that was essentially a private homeowners
association. 274

despite its problems; Briffault and the pessimists think that those problems are proof that the
optimists' vision of local government is doomed.
Moreover, framing the dispute as one about local autonomy makes strange bedfellows

unnecessarily. Thus, Frug and Tiebout are frequently paired as sharing the view that local
power is good-alongside wealthy suburbanites seeking to maintain walls against their poor
(and black) neighbors. But Frug, Tiebout, and the suburbanites each have radically different
ideas of what local government is good for. Frug (like the supporters of the township experiment)
believes that local participation can be a vehicle of reform, equality, and self-determination. For
Tiebout, these values are ancillary. The purpose of local government is to provide citizens with a
marketplace where they can choose the kind of services and governance that they prefer. And the
suburbanites look at local government in much the same way the opponents of the township did.
The purpose of local government is to protect property rights and preserve the existing
distribution of wealth, power, and racial hierarchy. Reorienting the terms of the discussion away
from local autonomy and toward the deeper dispute over what local government is good for puts
these strange bedfellows back in the right beds and, I will propose, lays a foundation for new
ways of thinking about contemporary problems in local government law.
272. Richard Briffault offers the somewhat pessimistic argument that this kind of privatized
municipal organization defines "our localism." He argues that the suburb itself has come to
represent our ideal of local self-government and that through that identification, "[t]he central
function of local government is to protect the home and family-enabling residents to raise their

children in 'decent' surroundings, servicing home and family needs and insulating home and
family from undesirable changes in the surrounding area." Briffault, supra note 16, at 382.

Although the dominant image of the suburb remains white and wealthy, the demographic reality
is that American suburbs are increasingly racially and economically diverse. Alongside the
rebirth of many cities has come a new movement of poor and minority residents to the suburbs.
The result has been so-called "melting pot suburbs" in major metropolitan areas across the
United States. See WILLIAM H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: How NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS
ARE REMAKING AMERICA 159 (2014). In 2014, Ferguson, Missouri, brought this fact into national

prominence, showing clearly that poverty and racial injustice are suburban problems as well as
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In the 1950s, the neighboring city of Torrance was threatening
to annex wealthy unincorporated areas on its borders, and Rolling
Hills and its neighboring communities were targeted. In response,
rather than fight off the advances of Torrance to remain in
unincorporated land, the residents of Rolling Hills voted to incorporate
as a separate city. 2 7 5 By incorporating, Rolling Hills essentially
protected its private character while avoiding redistributive taxes.
Today, the roads and common spaces are still maintained by the
private community association, the walls of the city remain up, and
not only are visitors not welcome, but there is an ordinance assessing
a fine on any uninvited visitor who enters. 276
The story of Rolling Hills pits against each other two competing
ideas of what local government is good for. On the one hand, Torrance
sought to annex Rolling Hills in order to bring those residents into the
city polity. This approach reflected an inclusive, integrationist,
expansive, and frankly redistributive aspiration for the citycapturing new property tax revenue was a primary motivation. If the
annexers were not precisely communitarian localists, they were at
least in sympathy with that vision of the purpose of local government.
The opponents of annexation (and proponents of incorporation) had a
different view. As their subsequent actions showed, they wanted local
government to protect their property values, keep their taxes low, and
preserve the existing distributions of wealth, power, and racial
hierarchy within their walls. Even if they were not proprietary in
precisely the same sense as southern conservatives, they shared a
basic vision of what local government was (and is) good for.
Rolling Hills, and the modern suburban story that it
represents, is critically different from the township experiment in two
ways that serve as reminders of the limits of presentism. First, Rolling
Hills and other proprietary suburbs are using local autonomy to
advance proprietary localist goals. During Reconstruction, it was the
communitarian Yankees who championed local control and
autonomy. 27 7 This difference highlights the extent to which competing
ideas about what local government should do are not tethered to

urban problems. See, e.g., Pete Saunders, The Death of America's Suburban Dream, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/sep/05/death-america-suburban-dreamferguson-missouri-resegregation [https://perma.cc/ND2W-PVN2].
273. GARY MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 88
(1981).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 91.
277. See supra Part II.
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specific local government structures in the present. The point is not
that local control now always serves proprietary ends, but rather that
proprietary ends are sometimes served by local control. More
precisely, the question is not whether local control should rest in the
suburb, the city, or the region. The question is what those with that
local control expect to do with it.
The first difference is a reminder that the ideas operate
differently in different contexts. The second difference is a reminder
that the ideas cannot be transplanted pure from the history. The
advocates of incorporation in Rolling Hills defended local control not
only as a means of protecting their property, but also in terms of
protecting their democratic rights of self-government. Incorporation,
on its surface, seems to serve the participatory goal at the heart of
communitarian localism. If centralization threatens democratic selfdetermination, then incorporation defends it. Indeed, "local control"
has become a watchword for suburban localism on the model of Rolling
Hills all across the country. 278 Although this difference from
Reconstruction is dramatic, it would be a mistake to accept that the
two competing localisms are no longer helpful. Proprietary localist
goals may be cloaked in democracy and yet remain hostile to
By
and even competing ideas of democracy.
participation
incorporating, Rolling Hills preserved its existing system of propertyoriented protectionist government 279 against the threat of being
subsumed into a more diverse and more robust urban municipal
government. In some ways, joining Torrance would have made local
governance in Rolling Hills more participatory across a broader and
more diverse polity, even while it diluted the specific local power of the
small group of landowners.
B. Memphis Schools-Segregation and Proprietary"Local Control"
The pessimists among local government law scholars often
begin their arguments from the observation that "our localism," as a
descriptive matter, broadly protects existing racial and economic

278. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 384-85.
279. Prior to incorporation, Rolling Hills operated as a private homeowners association
("HOAs"). HOAs often operate as mirror images of proprietary municipalities. According to Evan
McKenzie, in 1992, "there were 150,000 associations privately governing an estimated 32 million
Americans." EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994). These HOAs are sometimes situated within towns

and cities and are sometimes situated on unincorporated county land. They often operate as
quasi-governments. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1519, 1520 (1982) (analyzing the legal status of homeowners associations).
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inequalities. 2 80 Segregation in public education is one of the clearest
examples of this problem. Since the end of de jure school segregation
with Brown v. Board of Education, suburban school districts have
retreated to the protection of "local control" to defend against the
threat of integration across municipal boundaries. 28 1
A stark recent example of this use of "local control" took place
in Shelby County, Tennessee, beginning in 2010. Prior to 2010, there
were two school districts in Shelby County-Memphis City Schools
("MCS") and Shelby County Schools ("SCS").2 8 2 The student population
of MCS was more than ninety percent black and Hispanic, 28 3 and an
overwhelming majority of MCS
students were economically
disadvantaged. 2 84 By contrast, the student body of SCS was much
more racially diverse and much better off economically. 285

280. Sheryll Cashin describes this as the "tyranny of the favored quarter" who wield local
control as a weapon to avoid the tax burdens of life in a metropolitan region while protecting
their own services and reaping the benefits of "the region's public infrastructure investments and
job growth." Cashin, supra note 270, at 1987. Richard Briffault has argued that the suburban
model of local government, which allows for exclusion and protection of existing distributions of
wealth and power, has become the paradigm for (and dominant form of) American local
government law. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 382.
281. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy
has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for
public schools and to the quality of the educational process."). Erika Wilson has argued that the
power of "local control" in arguments over public education has "elevated localism in education to
a near constitutional norm." Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in
Education Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 625, 642 (2011). In contemporary usage, "local control" has become a watchword for
conservative opponents of centralized control of public education. Donald Trump repeatedly
advocated for "local control" over education on the campaign trail in 2016, by which he meant a
decreased federal role, an end to the common core national standards, and support for school
vouchers and charter schools. See Louis Freedberg, Trump Choice for Secretary of Education
Calls for 'Local Control'of Schools, EDSOURCE (Dec. 12, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/trumpchoice-for-secretary-of-education-calls-for-local-control-of-schools/574 155 [https://perma.cc/TG58DGAL].
282. See Daniel Kiel, The Enduring Power of Milliken's Fences, 45 URB. LAWYER 137, 157
(2013). Kiel has documented the Memphis/Shelby County story in a series of law review articles.
In a separate article, Michelle Anderson has also discussed the story reflecting on its
implications for regionalism in public education. See Michelle Anderson, Making a Regional
District: Memphis City Schools Dissolves into Its Suburbs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 47
(2012). I should note here that my own treatment of this story is a summary and thus necessarily
elides many of the complications, complexities, and nuances of a rich and messy situation.
283. See Anderson, supra note 282, at 50.
284. Kiel, supra note 282, at 157.
285. See Anderson, supra note 282, at 50 (demonstrating that 52.3% of SCS students were
white, while 42.4% were black and Hispanic). Only 37.1% of SCS students were economically
disadvantaged. See id. at 47, note 3.
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Plans to merge the two districts had been discussed (and
resisted by residents of the suburbs) for years. 28 6 In December 2010,
the Memphis School Board made the decision, without county input by
voting, to dissolve and surrender its charter. 287 By disappearing, the
school board was essentially voting to create a single, unified Shelby
County school district. Faced with an immediate threat to the local
control of SCS, suburban residents petitioned the state legislature for
relief, and the legislature acted quickly. Before any district lines could
be erased or any students reassigned, Tennessee passed a law that
delayed the merger through a complex transition planning process
and gave suburbs within Shelby County the power to incorporate as
separate school districts and thus withdraw from the merged
district.288 By the fall of 2012, less than a year after MCS had voted to
dissolve, six suburban municipalities in Shelby County had voted to
create new school districts insulated from SCS and were thus immune
from the merger. The result was that Memphis merged with the
poorer and less organized parts of the county, while the richer suburbs
maintained and strengthened their borders against racial and
economic integration. 289 In the end, the county schools have become
less racially and economically diverse, protected behind their new
boundaries. 290
Throughout the struggle between proponents and opponents of
consolidation, localism and local control were watchwords. In Daniel
Kiel's interpretation, a central lesson of the whole affair was that a
desire for local control over education trumped all other
considerations: "Opposition was based on the very idea of breaking

286. Daniel Kiel, A Memphis Dilemma: A Half-Century of Public Education Reform in
Memphis and Shelby County from Desegregation to Consolidation,41 U. MEM. L. REV. 787, 82526 (2011).
287. See id. at 833-35.
288. See Anderson, supra note 282, at 54. The state-mandated transition planning
commission was stacked against Memphis, with state and county representatives having more
than twice as many seats on the commission as the city school board.
289. See Kiel, supra note 282, at 164-65.
290. The new SCS look a lot like the old MCS (8% white, 90% black and Hispanic, 59%
disadvantaged). Five of six new districts are significantly whiter and richer than the old SCS:
Arlington is 75% white, 21% black and Hispanic, 6% disadvantaged; Bartlett is 62% white, 32%
black and Hispanic, 18% disadvantaged; Collierville is 65% white, 23% black and Hispanic, 7%
disadvantaged; Germantown is 74% white, 16% black and Hispanic, 2% disadvantaged; and
Lakeland is 76% white, 14% black and Hispanic, 7% disadvantaged. Of the six new districts, only
Millington retains something like the old demographics of the old SCS (45% white, 52% black
and Hispanic, 35% disadvantaged). For all statistics, see, State Report Cards, TENN. DEP'T
EDUC., https://www.tn.gov/education/topic/report-card (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) [https://perma
.cc/9A2P-S2FK].

490

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2:413

down the [district] lines, not on any particular policy .
."2
The
suburban residents who opposed consolidation framed it as a threat to
local control, and they framed the promised new regional district as
centralization and a dilution of local power. They framed the
threatened consolidation as an intrusion. 292
The Memphis suburbs advanced a set of proprietary arguments
about what local government was for. As in Rolling Hills, they
harnessed the language of local control to protect private property and
to perpetuate existing distributional inequalities. They represented
the "bad" localism that pessimists see as pervasive in our localism.
But opposition to that kind of localism under the guise of regionalism
or some other name is not a rejection of localism but rather a different
vision of localism. If the suburbanites sought more "local control,"
what was it that the Memphis-based consolidators were seeking? They
were not seeking centralization at the state level-it was the state
legislature that stepped in to protect the local control of the
suburbanites. Nor were they seeking some sort of federal, technocratic
control. Instead, their regionalism looks more like an alternative form
of localism. The newly merged school district was appealing not
because it limited local control, but rather because it enhanced their
local control by erasing suburban boundary lines. The consolidators
sought to match the local polity to the local problem. Memphis and
Shelby County were perfect examples of the problem of the "favored
quarter" that Sheryll Cashin identified. 293 Suburbanites benefitted
from the services and infrastructure of the metropolitan area while
refusing to share the regional burdens. Consolidation would have
allowed Memphis (with twice the population of the suburbs) to exert
more "local control" over the problem of education.
Seen this way, regionalism is as much a form of localism as
suburban "local control." This view circles back to communitarian and
proprietary localism again. The real struggle in Memphis was not over
whether there should be local control. It was over the purpose of local
government. Suburbanites argued for more local control, defending an
essentially proprietary idea of what local government should do:
protect private property, keep tax revenue local, and maintain existing
distributions of wealth, power, and racial hierarchy. 294 Consolidators
argued for regionalism, defending a more communitarian vision of

291. See Kiel, supra note 282, at 165-66.
292. Id.
293. See Cashin, supra note 270, at 1987.
294. See Kiel, supra note 282, at 165-66 (describing the tensions surrounding the Memphis
merger in terms of local control).
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what local government should do: create a meaningful local polity,
give political stakes to the relevant stakeholders, and wield local
government as a tool of progress and more equitable distribution. 295
C. State Takeovers-Communitarian"Local Control"
Sometimes proprietary localism takes the form of new
protectionist local structures. A third contemporary example is
strikingly parallel to the strategy that the conservatives employed in
North Carolina when they gutted the township experiment. When
cities and towns face fiscal crises, it has become increasingly common
for state legislatures to step in and assume the reins of local control. 296
In the most extreme form, a state takeover means that the state ousts
local (usually elected) officials, replacing them with state-appointed
officers or boards charged with righting the fiscal ship. 2 9 7 When this
happens, attitudes about local autonomy flip. It is the descendants of
the communitarian localists who argue in favor of local control and
against centralization, while the decedents of proprietary localists
celebrate the virtues of state control.
The dynamics of these modern state takeovers are very similar
to the strategies employed across the South during Redemption to
discipline local governance. Then, the paternalism and white
supremacy were explicit: state control was required to protect against
"negro domination" and misrule. 298 Today, the picture is muddier. The
justification for contemporary state takeovers is also misrule, but
misrule in the shape of corruption 299 and financial mismanagement. 3 0 0
Some of these claims have merit; others tread closely to a racialized
and class-based indictment of post-white-flight municipal governance.
Those who defend the takeovers argue that poorly run,
democratically elected local governments do not serve the interests of

295. Id.
296. In a recent article, Clayton Gillette collected instances of state takeovers, creating a
taxonomy of state interventions in local government from "monitoring without interference" to

the "direct takeover and displacement of local officials." Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for
Democracy: Takeovers of FinanciallyFailed Cities, 114 COLTM. L. REV. 1373, 1384-97 (2014).
297. As Gillette notes, in the most extreme instances of fiscal distress, states like Rhode
Island and Michigan have "authorized takeover boards to exercise the more radical measure of
fully displacing local officials." Id. at 1395.
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. Corruption was part of the argument for state takeovers in Camden, New Jersey;
Detroit, Michigan; Chelsea, Massachusetts; and Jefferson County, Alabama. Gillette, supra note
296, at 1408.
300. See id. at 1406 (casting light on the fiscal crisis New York City experienced in the
1970s).
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the local citizens. Thus, the argument goes: state takeover actually
serves to vindicate the "real" interests of the local community by
removing the tarnish of bad government.3 0 1 Critical to this argument
is the idea that a system of local government that serves the
"interests" of local citizens actually serves democracy in the short term
(by good governance) and in the long term (by building stronger local
institutions).
Substituting "interests" for democracy was central to the
proprietary localism during Redemption. Conservatives argued that
local government that uses taxpayers' money more wisely and protects
property rights governs better. 302 On this account, the lack of
participatory democratic input is a feature, not a bug, of the system
because it protects local governments from the messiness and misrule
of local democracy. Critically, however, limiting local "democracy" does
not mean abandoning localism. Supporters of takeovers believe that
the role of local government is to protect the interests of local
residents as measured by property values and existing distributional
measures. 303
It should be no surprise that modern-day communitarian
localists have pushed back against state takeovers, arguing that they
do not solve the problems at the root of distressed local governments
(segregation, depopulation, poverty). 304 Instead of creating the
conditions for local prosperity, state takeovers strip local power to
serve the interests of the state government-often preferring the
protection of property to policies that would redistribute power and

301. Clayton Gillette is the most prominent academic voice behind this position. See id. at
1400-01 (examining the effects of state intervention).
302. Richard Schragger has gently pushed back against the idea that a purely market-based
management of local government actually achieves better results. Responding to an earlier
article by Gillette, Schragger argued that it is unclear whether direct democracy or the marketbased discipline of bondholders reach measurably better "good governance" results. See Richard
C. Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 797 (2012) ("[B]asic
checks and balances and 'good government' do not sufficiently explain the low rates of municipal
failures.").
303. Gillette, supranote 296, at 1400-01.
304. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State
Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 582 (2012):
Centralization of power by the state on these terms does not ameliorate structural
causes of financial distress, like concentrated poverty, the loss of middle-class jobs
across a region, or local borders that fragment a single metropolitan area into
socioeconomically segregated cities. Indeed, local democratic dissolution may only
exacerbate fiscal malaise over the longer term by facilitating changes (like the abrupt
sale of public assets) that produce quick returns at the cost of permanent
sustainability.
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wealth. 305 Thus the debate between communitarian and proprietary
localism takes on much the same form that it had during
Reconstruction. The question is not bad government versus good
government. Rather, it is the promise of local power to upset the
status quo versus the interests of those with property to maintain
their control over wealth and power. As with Rolling Hills and
Memphis, and as with nearly every problem in local government law,
state takeovers present a conflict over what local government is good
for. As context varies, so too do the specifics of the answer to the
question. Sometimes those who see local government as a vehicle for
participation, civic engagement, and redistribution support robust
local control. Sometimes they oppose it. Sometimes those who see local
government as a tool for protecting property, keeping taxes low, and
maintaining the status quo distribution of wealth and power support
robust local control. Sometimes they oppose it. What remains stable
from past to present are the core arguments, even if the strategies and
structures evolve. Even if the shapes of these arguments are
impressionistic, they are recognizably associated with the differences
between communitarian and proprietary localism.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Local control and localism retain rhetorical power, but the
meaning of local control is contested. When legal scholars and legal
reformers discuss the virtues (and vices) of localism, they should be
clear about which of these contested meanings they intend to invoke.
The proprietary localism of the plantation was no less "local" and no
further from "the people" than the communitarian localism of the New
England town. As a slightly more prescriptive matter, once scholars
and reformers are clear about which virtues they are embracing, they
can learn from the failure of the township experiments the important
lesson that even if local government is woven into the fabric of a
place's "way of life," purely systemic reforms to local government
cannot, by themselves, drive broad social, cultural, and legal reforms.
Coming to terms with the fact that the very meanings and purposes of
local government are contested means encountering the complexity of
that contest in the messy political, social, and cultural context of lived
localism.

305. Schragger, supra note 302, at 801 ("A different (and more likely) explanation for the
punitive attitude toward municipalities is hostility to public employee unions or a more general
hostility to redistributional spending." (citation omitted)).
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A. The Virtues of Localism-Federalism
Along with the (mild) resurgence of limited government
federalism in the courts has come a new interest in linking federalism
with local government. The argument is that "localities represent
better sites for pursuing federalism's values because they are closer to
the people, offer more realistic options for voting with one's feet, and
map more closely onto communities of interest." 306 David Barron has

argued that local governments should get the benefit of some of the
deference that states receive under classic federalism. 307 Heather
Gerken has argued that we should take the principle "all the way
down" past the city to the smallest existing forms of local government:
school boards, juries, water districts. 3 0 8
This move implicitly accepts the first proposition of Tea Party
federalists (the one that they hold in common with Jefferson): that the
federal government is not the best forum for republican selfgovernance-at least in some areas of the law. Local government
federalists argue that states, in their modern form, are not much
better as fora for self-government. The appeal of the increasingly local
focus is that the more local we go, the closer to "the people" we get. 3 0 9
The question is: Who are "the people"? And do we really want
to be close to them? Lurking behind local government federalism is, I
think, a latent communitarian localism that answers that "the people"
are in community with each other and are participating with each
other to govern themselves. But seen through the history of the
township experiment, my story suggests that we should be skeptical of
attributing the virtues of communitarian localism to all local
governments. Where proprietary localism holds sway, deferring to
local authority might mean deferring to the forces most directly
responsible for maintaining segregation and economic inequality. Just
as we might be wary of deferring to the "local knowledge" of the feudal
planter, so too might we be wary of seeking the voice of the people in
proprietary suburbs. The meanings and purposes of local government
306. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARv. L. REV. 4, 23
(2010).
307. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) ("[Olur towns and cities are what we know them to be:
important political institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the contours of 'ordinary
civic life in a free society.' ").
308. Gerken, supra note 306, at 24.
309. Taking just one example from Gerken's search for "the people" in smaller local
formations: "Juries' decisions would give us a more fine-grained read on where the People
stand.... [O]ne involving face-to-face interactions unmediated by political parties or electoral
politics." Id. at 32.
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are contested. If we seek something like Jefferson's ideal fit between
individual and government in the most local arrangements, we must
be prepared to be disappointed. Even if communitarianism and
democratic legitimacy can sometimes be found, so too can exclusionary
proprietary localism. In other words, one might follow self-government
"all the way down" looking for Tocqueville's town and instead find a
plantation.
There are two related takeaways here. First, there is a risk in
accepting the first postulate of contemporary federalism: that the
federal government is a poor representative of "the people" and we
should look for a better one. Where we look to find "the people" whose
authority we want to advance should and must depend on what we
want from them. If we seek places where participatory democracy and
communal spirit are vibrant, then we should discriminate between
various kinds of localism to privilege the one we want. With this in
mind, we might find that larger scale governments actually look more
communitarian because the mechanisms for participation and
collective engagement are more robust than at the local level.
Relatedly, if the goal is truly to find those places where "the
people" are self-governing, there are a lot of troubling questions that
we must confront. In a wealthy, gated, and homogeneous suburb, "the
people," narrowly defined, are in control. But they have used that
control in service of exclusion and anti-government retreat. 310 If we
seek better, more diverse, more egalitarian visions of self-governance,
then we have to do more than follow the local all the way down.
Instead, we have to look for what we are really looking for: traces of
communitarian localism. Those traces might be evident in government
institutions, or they might be evident elsewhere outside of any
formalized government body.3 11 In some instances, from some
perspectives, that localism might look like giving local governments
more control, and in some it might look like taking control away. But
if we remember that the localisms that we like and the localisms that
we don't like are both localism, then it must be true that advancing
one vision will come at the expense of another. One person's local
control is another person's tyranny

310. As Richard Ford, among others, has argued, allowing local governments to draw
boundaries and self-define the limits of their community can result in exclusion and allow local
governments to operate as instruments of racial oppression. Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1860-61
(1994).
311. We might find them in churches, book clubs, little leagues, summer camps, etc.

496

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2:413

B. Integration and Redistribution
The problem that faced both Republican and conservative
southerners in 1868 was racial inequality and integration. The
problem of racial inequality, rooted in segregation, although much
changed, has not gone away. In both past and present, the problems
are essentially local. I am willing to admit freely that I admire the
efforts of the revolutionaries, idealists, and utopians who brought the
town south with them during Reconstruction. Their grand goal of
fixing the South from the ground up with communitarian
participatory democracy was laudable. To indulge in the
counterfactual: I think that we would be better off today had they
succeeded.
Instead, much of our local government law today preserves
structural inequalities rather than breaking them down. Today's
communitarians face the same questions that Tourg6e and his fellow
travelers faced in 1868: How can local government be a tool for
dismantling inequality and building a better politics? The township
experiments show starkly the danger of relying on structural reform
alone to change deeply ingrained cultural practices. The North
Carolina Republicans were too right in their diagnosis of the problem:
slavery and the plantation system were embedded in the lived
localism of the South. Simply erasing the positive legal structures that
supported them was not enough. Plantation localism was so powerful
that, when it was challenged with the township experiment,
conservative southerners found a way to return to an approximation of
it by other means.
One possible conclusion is that local government is simply not
the right place to launch an attack on deep social problems. Even if it
is true that local government reflects an ingrained "way of life," it may
be that that the currents of that "way of life" run too deep to be
accessed by reform. Under this account, the failure of the township
experiments was inevitable because plantation localism was the
fundamental structure of southern life.
The history of the township experiment shows, I think, that
this is the wrong conclusion to draw. The Redeemers fought off the
township experiments with effort. In pockets, communitarian localism
was starting to change the political realities of North Carolina. It was
precisely this demonstrated risk that made the township a primary
target of Redemption. Thus, even as the township experiment shows
the risk of purely structural reform, it also shows the promise that
strong participatory self-governance can lead to change.
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The problem is not that local reform cannot work, but rather
that reformers have to be attentive to the complex dynamics at play.
Where systemic reform stokes racial or outsider resentment, that
resentment has fueled a turn against communitarian participation
and toward proprietary protectionism. The answer is not to avoid
stoking those resentments, but rather to account for them. Any
communitarian localist reform should be calibrated to protect against
proprietary backlash.
C. Plantationson the Cul de Sac
One final takeaway is less prescriptive than provoking. The
history here suggests a link (more oblique than direct) between the
modern proprietary suburb and the plantation. Although we still tend
to think of Tocqueville and Jefferson's ideal democracies when we
think of American local government, this Article suggests that we
might do better to think of Fitzhugh's plantation. Perhaps the real
American ideal is not to be a civically responsible yeoman, but rather
a small-scale feudal lord, master of your small domain: a planter on
the cul de sac.
The strong version of this provocation does not stand up to
close scrutiny. The distinctions between the planter and the
homeowner are too extreme and the differences between the
antebellum county courts and the modern proprietary suburb are too
wide. Still, the mere suggestion might do some good. Forcing those of
us who study and work on local government to grapple with the
tradition of plantation localism and its past and present power might
change the way we think about the value and risks of local
government. If we take seriously the possibility that our localism
exists to vindicate our "forbidden appetite" 312 for a planter's total
control, then perhaps we have a more realistic picture of how race,
property, and power have structured the local government that we
have. That proprietary appetite operates under the veneer of
communitarian rhetoric. Perhaps by naming it, by "count[ing its] teeth
and claws," 3 1 3 we can finally confront it and let it go.

312. Recall that this was the charge that the Republicans leveled against the opponents of
the township experiment in North Carolina. To the People of North Carolina, supranote 150.
313. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).

